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ABSTRACT

This unit focuses on the classic problem of the place of military power in a democratic society. Early sections examine the relationship between civil and military authority as developed in colonial America and written into the Constitution. The second half of the unit invites consideration of the relevance and workability of the earlier tradition of civil supremacy in a modern world of total war, technological complexity, and enormous military budgets. Students deal with the controversy over civilian control of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Truman-MacArthur clash, the right to conscientious objection, the possibilities for a military take-over in the United States, and current problems of both the legislative and executive branches in dealing with military power. (See SO 000 161 for a listing of related documents.) (Author/SBE)

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TEACHER'S MANUAL

MILITARY POWER IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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This unit was initially prepared in the summer of 1966.

This unit focusses on the classic problem of the place of military power in a democratic society. It examines the question as to whether the traditional relationship between civil and military authority as developed in colonial America and written into the Constitution, is still relevant in the era of the Cold War. In an age of nuclear weaponry and conflicting ideologies, the United States must necessarily maintain a powerful military establishment. The possibility that their establishment may itself pose a threat to democratic society raises the question of how the tradition of civil supremacy can be maintained.

SECTION I

THE PROBLEM RAISED

Section I poses the problem in the initial selection, drawn from President Eisenhower's farwell address to the American people, which warns of the dangers inherent in "the military-industrial complex." This warning raises several questions:

Is this threat a serious one? Is the United States in any danger of becoming overly concerned with military power and, as Eisenhower implies, is such concern basically unhealthy in a peace-living democracy?

The last three selections (#2-4) speak to some of the implications of the question. Secretary McNamara, by relating such non-military service as the Peace Corps to the needs of the selective service system, poses the question as to whether all citizens have a obligation to perform some institutionalized service in the interest of national security. Fifteen years fefore, Senator Bricker, speaking of a proposal for universal military service, had suggested the basic incompatability between the traditional American values and the principle of required service. On the basis of these selections, a challenging discussion could develop as to whether compulsory non-military service would in effect run afoul of the Senator's warning and constitute a threat to American liberty. Out os such a discussion might well come an awareness that the nature of war in the modern era has changed since previous wars, and that consequently the whole nature of the relationship between military and civil authority becomes at once more complicated and more subtle than ever before.

The final selection (#4) poses the question from the point of view of the individual rather than society. Do people have a right to disobey laws which draft them into a military establishment which they feel to be harmful to the United States and to other nations as well? In this connection the overtones of conscience and religion in the personal statements of the individual draft card burners should be discussed fully.

SECTION II

MILITARY POWER AND CIVIL AUTHORITY IN EARLY AMERICA

Section II explores the problem of military power in the years 1620-1787.

Part A shows how Plymouth, the first New England colony, coped with the problem of military power and more specifically, how that colony's legislative body kept the military subservient to its authority.

Students might first be asked to discuss how the military system of Plymouth functioned. More specific questions might be: Which persons served in the armed forces? What were their military obligations? How were military officers chosen? What were their functions?

These questions lead to the larger question of how the colony's legislative body, the General Court, maintained control of the armed forces. Certain selections are helpful in explaining this point. For example, the first caluse of the first selection which states that all residents were subject to military training, demonstrates that the General Court established a part-time, citizen-soldiery similar to our reserves instead of a separate, professional army which might have been more difficult to control. The regulations governing the military company (#2), is an example of the General Court's assertion of civilian supremacy. The last two clauses of Instructions for the Major (#4) state that the major must consult with a "council of war," chosen by the General Court. The last clause of the 1653 preparations for war (#6) illustrates that complete control of all military matters in time of peace and war rested in the hands of an essential civilian body, the council of war, which consisted of six civilians and three military officers appointed by the General Court. The military orders (#2) and Court Order of 1646 (#5) demonstrate that military officers were elected by the soldiers and approved by the General Court, thereby providing a double check against the establishment of a separate class of professional military officers whose interests might be antagonostic to civilian authority.

Part B examines the English tradition of civil-military relationships.

Students can be asked if they see any similarities between the military systems of Plymouth and England. The royal orders (#1 and 2) demonstrate basic similarities between the militia of England and New England. In both systems all men were required to arm themselves and to undergo periodic trainings. In addition, all men were sworn to bear their arms in the cause of the civil authority. In essence, both of these military systems were based on the principle of universal military training, which was denounced by Senator Bricker (I,3). An interesting question here might be: Would the Senator consider the systems of universal military training in England and in early America a threat to the liberties of the people?

The Petition of Right and The Agreement of the People (#3 and 4) imply that the principle of civilian supremacy was formulated early in English society. Discussion should lead to the implications of this principle for Plymouth Colony, which resolved its problem partly in towns of the English tradition. Again, the fact that universal military training in both Plymouth and England did not prove incompatible with the principle of civilian supremacy raises significant questions about Senator Bricker's denunciation of universal military training in the modern period.

Students can be asked: What does Colonel Ward's statement about the English militia's attitude toward drills (#5) tell you about the nature of a civilian-soldiery? Students will realize that this type of fighting force had built-in weaknesses if judged according to professional military standards. They might also question whether such a casual military force could ever be much of a threat to anybody's liberties. Students might also be asked: Does Colonel Ward's statement tell you anything about the nature of the soldier-citizen forces established in Plymouth?

Part C is concerned with the nature of the civilian fighting force established by Plymouth and the other New England colonies. It raises the question as to what can be learned about the relationship between civil and military authority in this period from an analysis of the militia in action.

It is important that students do not view this merely as an exercise for determining whether or not this militia was an effective fighting force. The subtleties involved may emerge from the juxtaposition of Washington's condemnation of the militia during the Revolutionary War (#18) and Closen's praise of the militia's role in defending Boston and Charlestown (#1). This should stimulate a discussion dealing with the specific circumstances in which a democratic fighting force was effective and those in which it was ineffective.

Closen's statement, for example, suggests that the militia were extremely effective in defending their own homes and towns.

The statements of Lord Percy (#4) and the statements concerning the defeat of the Welch Fusiliers at Bunker Hill (#8) support Closen. Would a professional army have performed as well under similar circumstances?

On the other hand, students might be asked what Washington's statement (#18) reveals about the limitations of a democratic army in action. This statement suggests that the militia was ineffective in any prolonged operation staged away from home. The excerpts from Mackenzie's diary (#17) supports Washington's opinion. Students might be asked what limitations this characteristic of the militia imposed upon the military leadership's attempt to organize a long range strategy for defeating the British.

The selections illustrating the reluctance of the militia of one colony to assist the militia of another (#2, 3, and 5) raises obvious questions: Is this attitude understandable? Given the scarcity of manpower and the reluctance to leave their homes unprotected, was it really inexcusable for Connecticut's militia to refuse to assist the Massachusetts militia during Rale's War (#5)? Why did the General Assembly of New Hampshire dislike the idea of sending its militia out to serve on the distant Massachusetts frontier (#3)?

A careful study of those selections illustrating the attitude of the colonists toward the military (#6, 9-11, and 19) reveal the anti-militarist tradition in America; the apathy of Plymouth's democratic military company toward the election of its officers (#6); the refusal of Massachusetts and New York to maintain adequate fortification (#11 and 19); the failure of the Rhode Island company clerks to impose fines for infractions of military regulations upon the militiamen who elected him (#9); the eagerness in Rhode Island to demobilize military forces and the colony's fear of adopting a permanent military code (#10). Students might be asked: Is this casual attitude toward military preparedness with us still today? Is it possible for us to strike as non-militaristic a posture in the Cold War as in the early American period?

Part C also affords the students an opportunity to evaluate these selections with the eye of an historian. For example, was Lord Percy (#4) giving an honest opinion of the militia or was he trying to justify ~~the~~ near defeat of the British at Concord? Was the militia really as bad as Washington claimed (#18) or was he purposely painting a black picture so as to get Congress to provide more reinforcements? How can two contemporaries, poet Archer (#15) and soldier Washington (#18), come to such different conclusions about the effectiveness of the militia? What actual experience did the Earl of Sandwich (#12) have with the colonial soldier?

At this point students can be asked to comment on what historian Daniel Boorstin refers to as "the myth of preparedness." Boorstin claims that most militia units did fight well when their immediate safety was at stake but that colonial America was by no means "a nation of minutemen," as implied by earlier historians. Students can be asked how such a lasting myth about the quality of the democratic soldier got started. How might a poem like Archer's "The Volunteer Boys" (#15) tend to glorify the militia? How would the statements of Americans about the defeat of the Welch Fusiliers at Bunker Hill (#8) tend to contribute to the image of the militia which Boorstin is attacking?

As a concluding assignment for this part, students can be asked to write an essay explaining what their analysis of the militia in action revealed about the relationship between civil and military authority as it evolved in the New England colonies.

Part D discusses the question of military power in the American Revolution and the Constitution and suggests that the restraints imposed upon the military in early colonial society continued to operate during the War and were a major factor in determining the military-civil settlement established by the Constitution in 1787.

Two major questions emerge from the selections in Part D. The first is Why was a stronger military power in the new government? The debates on this subject centered on provisions relating to a standing army, the state militia, and the power to make war (#7). Before the students read how these questions were resolved in the Constitution (#8 and 11), they can be asked how they themselves would resolve these problems in light of the traditions and experiences of colonial society.

After the students have read the Constitutional settlement, they should discuss the specific ways in which the principles of civilian supremacy and of "checks and balances" guided the founding fathers in their organization of military power. For example, the President, a civilian, was made commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The right to make two year appropriations for the army gave Congress a substantial role in controlling the military. Control of the state militia was divided between the state and the federal government. The second and third amendments guaranteed the people the right to bear arms and protected them against the unlawful quartering of troops. Students can be encouraged to speculate as to whether the Constitutional Settlement has any relevancy in the modern period.

The debates in the Virginia convention (#9) and the excerpts from the Federalist Papers (#12) were included to show how some citizens reacted to the Constitutional settlement of the military-civilian question.

SECTION III

TWO VOICES FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

This section affords an opportunity for reflection about the nature of the constitutional settlement of the question the civil military authority and invites speculation about its possible relevancy in modern times.

The first selection by Tocqueville raises several questions: What does Tocqueville's analysis of America's geographical position imply about the constitutional settlement of the problem? If he is right in saying that early America did not need a strong military because of its geographical isolation, then the constitutional settlement had, in fact, been easy to arrive at. If Tocqueville's analysis is correct, is this settlement still relevant in a nuclear world where oceans no longer serve as effective barriers?

Does Tocqueville's prediction that "a large army amid a democratic people will always be a source of great danger" (#2), have any implications for the modern era in which we must maintain a large standing army? Does Tocqueville's warning that war is dangerous because it must "invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government "and because it leads men to despotism not by sudden violence" but "more gently," (#3) have any relevance for the United States in today's world?

Two questions arise from Clausewitz's statement that political control does not end when war begins and that the military must always be subordinated to the political arm of government (III, B): (1) Did the constitutional settlement insure that war would be an extension of policy, always subordinate to political direction? (2) Can the military point of view be subordinated to the political in the United States today when such great efforts and expenditures are directed toward preserving national security?

Discussion of the preceding statements lead to the realization that the principle of civilian supremacy which was institutionalized in the constitutional settlement is being challenged by new developments.

SECTION IV

CIVIL SUPREMACY AND THE COLD WAR

This section examines the place of military power in the modern period.

The major question in this section is whether the principle of civilian supremacy is being threatened by the tremendous growth of the military establishment.

Students should keep two questions in mind while reading the selections: (1) Do the early American traditions governing civil-military relations still apply in the age of atomic warfare? (2) Can democracy manage the tremendous military establishment needed to safeguard our national security?

Part A presents the growth of the military establishment since 1789. Study will show that, though the armed forces and the defense budgets were reduced after every war, this did not happen after the Korean War in 1950.

Students should be allowed ample time to study the charts and graphs. They should see the connections between the fluctuations during war and post-war periods throughout American history. The charts showing the number of civilian workers in the military departments of the government and the expenditure related to defense (#4-6) point out that the military establishment has had a substantial impact on the civilian economy.

In Part B the struggle between the civil and military arms of government for control of the development of atomic energy after World War II focussed attention on how society solves new problems of military power in terms of its traditions and past experiences. The attempt of the military to dominate the Atomic Energy Commission is seen as posing a possible threat to the tradition of civil supremacy. Only after a prolonged debate was the traditional balance between military and civil power upheld.

A basic question for discussion here is: What were the arguments for and against civilian control of the AEC? A second question might be: In the light of subsequent developments, was the decision of Congress to establish a civilian dominated Atomic Energy Commission a wise one?

Part C outlines the conflict between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. Involved here is more than the question of who shall direct the war, soldier or citizen, for the Cold War has added two new factors to the problem of civilian-military relations: the concept of limited war, necessitated by nuclear stalemate; and the weight of world-wide public opinion.

The students might well be referred back to Clausewitz's statement that war is an extension of policy and must, therefore, always be subordinate civil authority (III, B). The question can then be asked: In terms of Clausewitz's statement, was Truman justified in dismissing MacArthur?

Students will want to investigate Truman's reason for "firing" the General. The President's argument (#5 and 6) is based on the contention that the General transcended the traditional political limits imposed upon the military. Truman's argument is supported by Senator Greene (#9) who claimed that the General was making policy on the battlefield, thereby subordinating political to military considerations. Bradley's testimony (#9) points out that MacArthur's proposal to extend the war into China might have involved us in "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

MacArthur's statement (#9), "when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military," would imply he did not accept the philosophy of Clausewitz. MacArthur defends his actions claiming that his one concern was for a quick and total victory which would end the mounting toll of casualties. Earlier, he pointed out that the way to a quick and complete victory was to extend the war to China (#2 and 4), even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that this course was unwise and unnecessary (#1 and 3).

A full discussion of whether the principle of civilian supremacy, as evolved in the early American period and articulated by Clausewitz, has any relevance for the modern period might result from asking: Was Truman trying to fight a 20th century war with an 18th century philosophy?

This would lead to a discussion of the influence of public opinion on civil-military relations in modern period. General MacArthur did not hesitate to take his cause to the people. In a remarkable speech before the Massachusetts legislature (#10) the General said that his oath as a soldier was taken to the country and the Constitution, not to those "who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch." What makes MacArthur's position here all the more remarkable is that public opinion would seem to have been overwhelmingly on his side, as evidenced by the condemnation of Truman by Chicago residents (#7) and the great reception accorded MacArthur when he returned to the United States (#8).

A discussion of the role of public opinion in the Cold War and its implications for the tradition of civilian supremacy might result from asking: Why did the people support MacArthur? Students may realize that more is involved than the people's token homage to an old soldier. They may realize that the prolonged tensions resulting from the Cold War may cause public opinion to side with the military and become in itself a threat to civilian supremacy.

In such circumstances, what is the relevance of Clausewitz' argument? Are the military, bent on victory, and the people, militant and tense and inspired by their military heroes, really one and the same? Are they united and driven toward supporting the principle of military supremacy? May statesmen be eventually forced to succumb to this trend?

Part D raises two questions: Is the power of the purse any longer an effective agent in maintaining civil control when the complexity of the modern military establishment may in fact preclude Congress from discriminating or from doing much more than simply giving its approval? Considering the impact of military expenditures in the economy, would Congressmen be inclined to say no to the military even if it were possible for them to do so?

A question for discussion might be: Why is Congress today unable to use its control of the purse as an effective check on the size and influence of the military establishment? The selections from Representative Hoffman (#1) and Senator Fulbright (#3) imply that only military men understand the complexities of modern warfare and that thus the questions of how much money and what kind of programs are of necessity left up to them.

Another possible explanation of Congress' reluctance to pare down defense expenditures emerges from the article from The Times describing the opposition of many legislators to the closing of outdated shipyards because they fear the adverse impact on the local economies. This would imply in addition that possible political repercussions might dampen Congressional enthusiasm for tampering with military spending.

Coffin's statement (#7) on the military-industrial complex emphasizes that in one way or another too many people are guilty of viewing military expenditures from the standpoint of their own pocketbooks. This attitude is in part responsible for elevating the military-industrial complex to a posture of such great influence that Eisenhower articulated his fears to the American people (I, 1). The last five selections (#10-14) raise questions about the influence of military lobbies and public information programs in maintaining the powerful position of the military-industrial complex. Do they indicate that Eisenhower's fears were justified?

Part E asks whether the Secretary of Defense can effectively maintain the tradition of civilian supremacy or whether the office is basically an impossible one, beset by pressures from the military, from Congress, from the needs of the economy, from the drift toward the garrison state, and from sheer size and complexity.

The significance of the office of the Secretary of Defense in maintaining civil supremacy over our sprawling military establishment is brought out in the report from President Kennedy's task force (#1) and in Congressman Wright's speech (#2). Does Forrestal's suicide suggest symbolically that the office is impossible? Does the Secretary of Defense exert powerful leadership today merely because of the prodigious personal capacities of McNamara?

What pressures are being exerted upon Secretary McNamara as he attempts to impose civilian control over the military? The statements of Congressmen Gubser and Vinson (#2) by Admiral Anderson and General LeMay (#3 and 4) are relevant here. U. S. News and World Report (#4 and 5) implies that one reason why McNamara is under fire is because of his reduction of defense spending and its possible impact upon the economy. Can the Secretary of Defense cope with these pressures?

Schlesinger's statement (#7) suggests that McNamara's new computerized systems approach enables the Department of Defense to select methodically the best defense programs at the best prices. Discussion of Schlesinger's statement may give rise to a further question which goes back to Clausewitz: Does McNamara's systems approach, if indeed it is workable, suggest that in the modern world the military establishment is too complicated even for military men to run? Are we coming into an age when the old distinction between civil authority and military power is meaningless? Are not the military and the civilian being blended into one machine, grinding toward the creation of a "garrison state"--a state in which most of the nation's energies are directed toward the maintenance of its own national security? Has the new age made the traditional concept of civil supremacy established by the Constitutional settlement (II, D) and articulated by Clausewitz (III, B) totally irrelevant? Or will these traditions prevail even in the new era?

Students can be asked if the United States is moving in the direction of the garrison state? They can be referred back to Tocqueville's statement (III, A, 3) in which he warns of the tendency of war to concentrate power in the hands of government, or to Senator Bricker (I, 3), who stated that universal military training gives too much power to the federal government and starts us "down the road toward totalitarian government and maybe ultimate tyranny." In this connection the militaristic role of public opinion in the Truman-MacArthur controversy (IV, E, 7 and 8) is also important.

SECTION V

CAN IT REALLY HAPPEN?

Section V poses the open-ended question of whether a military take-over can occur in the United States. It requires students to review all they have discovered about civil-military relations and asks them to re-evaluate the place of the military in an era in which the tradition of civilian supremacy may or may not be relevant.

The chapter from Seven Days in May, vividly portrays the beginning of a fictional military coup in the United States. One question for discussion is: How did the military justify the attempted coup? Various passages in the novel refer students to how dissatisfaction with civilian policy led the Generals to try to impose their wills upon the government in a more direct way.

A major question for discussion: Can a military take-over actually happen? Discussion of this question can recapitulate the entire unit, as students review the entire tradition of civilian supremacy. Have we already been "taken over" by means of a more subtle process than the coup suggested in Seven Days in May--a process whereby the civilian and military have become one force united in the preservation of a state overwhelmingly concerned with national security? Have the Constitutional checks on military power been made ineffective by our overriding concern for our defensive system? Attempts to answer these questions involve the entire relationship of the military-industrial complex to a democratic society.

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STUDENT'S MANUAL

MILITARY POWER IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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INTRODUCTION

From the very beginning of recorded history man has had to provide a system of defense against his enemies. A fundamental rule of life has been that only the strong survive. Thus, the establishment and maintenance of adequate military force has been crucial to all civilizations.

Throughout history the position of military power in each society has depended upon many factors, such as the form of the government, the value of the society, and the aims of the leaders. In some societies, the military have become the dominant factor; in others a tradition of civil supremacy has developed. At no time in history has the role of the military and its relationship to civil authority been more important than in the present era of atomic weapons and conflicting ideologies.

This unit focuses upon this classic problem in the organization of all societies--the relationship between civil power and the military. The selections you will read pertain to two different periods in American history--the colonial period and the period of the Cold War. The unit highlights the fact that evolution from a relatively simple to a vastly complex military structure has of necessity an important bearing on the relationship between civil and military authority. A study of the problem in its earliest setting provides an insight into the complexities of the problem in the modern age, an age in which the continued existence of our democratic traditions may well depend upon the relationship between military and civil power.

SECTION I

THE PROBLEM RAISED

Since the close of World War II, the United States has been challenged repeatedly by the deadly threat of Communism. Crises such as Laos, Berlin, Cuba, Korea, Viet Nam have forced the United States into vigilance. This vigilance is manifested in the development of a sophisticated atomic arsenal which at a moment's notice can wreak more devastation than that wrought by all previous conflicts combined. Our military establishment has become so large and complex that it affects every single citizen--as a member of the armed forces, as a taxpayer over half of whose federal tax dollar is spent on defense, as a participant in an economy strongly geared to defense spending, or as an employee of one of thousands of defense industries. It can be said that all of us in one way or another are supporters, willing or not, of this great concentration of military power which is at once a blessing and a curse.

This first section raises the question as to the role which military power plays in our society.

1. In 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ended a lifetime career of political and military service to his country with a farewell address to the American people. The following is an excerpt from that address, "Liberty at Stake," before a nation-wide television audience on January 17, 1961:[1]

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[1] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Liberty is at Stake, Farewell Address," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXVII (February 1, 1961), 228-229.

> [The speaker recounts that this nation has witnessed four major wars in the first half of the century, it is preeminent in power, and its purposes have been peaceful; our military organization, designed to maintain peace, has become highly sophisticated and expensive. Eisenhower warns that the new "military-industrial complex? must not be allowed to assert undue influence in government if " "security and liberty (are to) prosper."]

2. Following is an excerpt from speech by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal, on May 18, 1966:[2]

> [In order to create a "community of interest" with other nations, MacNamara suggests that the youth of our country be asked to give two years to either military service, with Peace Corps or other "developmental" work. An exchange with other countries might be arranged. MacNamara claims that such an arrangement, combined with trade regulations and diplomatic observers, would allow this country to "build bridges" to other countries and to control the traffic over those bridges.]

3. Secretary McNamara's proposal for our "young generation" represented an attempt to put into a new context an old proposal for universal military training. Congress has periodically debated measures proposing universal military training since the outbreak of the Second World War. Senator Bricker of Ohio made an extensive analysis of such a proposal in 1951 and then offered the following comment on the floor of the Senate on March 9th:[3]

> This measure would disrupt American life and destroy the liberties upon which we have builded. It would change the entire concept of our social structure. It would give power to the military leaders and to the Government at Washington that they have never had before. The Government

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[2] The New York Times, May 19, 1966.

[3] Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., XCVII, 2183.

> could change our whole social fabric, destroy the possibilities of a boy planning his life, planning for a college education. If this program is attached to the society of America it will never be taken off.
>
> This program would result in starting down the road toward totalitarian government and maybe ultimate tyranny. It would lead us down the pathway which every decadent nation has marched to its ultimate destruction and death.

4. Following is an article entitled "5 Draft Card Burners Doused at Rally" which appeared on the front page of The New York Times on November 7, 1965:[4]

> [The article describes a scene in which five men attempt to set their draft cards afire, are doused by an onlooker with a fire extinguisher, and finally succeed in burning the cards. The article states that the act is punishable by up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine, but the FBI said "no arrest was imminent." Counter-demonstrators' signs are described as bearing derogatory names, such as "queens," and "pinkos." The five young men, and others, read statements about their act. These speakers urged taking action against uinjustice and burning more draft cards and claimed that terrorism perpetrated by the National Liberation Front does not justify the "violence the American Government has unleased against the Vietnamese people."]

SECTION II

MILITARY POWER AND CIVIL AUTHORITY IN EARLY AMERICA

This section takes you back to the colonial period in American history where the classic problem of civil-military relations appeared in its earliest setting in The New World. To a large degree the organization of colonial society depended upon the establishment of a strong military system, for savage Indians and rival colonists posed constant threats to colonial America. War with these adversaries was endless, and the period 1620 to 1763 was marked by seven major conflicts and hundreds of smaller skirmishes. In less menacing situations other societies with different traditions have established military governments. Although this did not develop in North America the proper role of the military was necessarily of concern to the people of New England throughout the early American era.

A. The Military System of Plymouth Colony

On Monday morning, November 13, 1620 the band of Pilgrims who were soon to settle Plymouth Colony, were forced to anchor the *Mayflower* for repairs off the shores of Massachusetts. As the ship's carpenters worked to mend the hull, the Pilgrims formed New England's first military force. Captain Miles Standish was put in charge, and the company, soon to be called the militia, was dispatched to protect the landing party which was exploring Cape Cod.

The documents in Part A trace the growth of the military forces in Plymouth. A history of this development can serve as an example of the way in which the New England colonies coped with the problem of the proper role of military force in civil society.

1. Between 1633 and 1643, Plymouth Colony's General Court or lawmaking body ordered:

> . . . that all and every person within this Government shalbee subject to such milletary order for training and exercyse of armes as hath bine agreed upon and enacted by the Court; . . .
>
> . . . that if any shalbee sent forth as a souldier and shall returne maimed he shalbee maintained competently by the Countrey during his life; . . .
>
> . . . that all the milletary Companies within this Government shalbee trained at the least six times in the yeare; . . .
>
> . . . that in the time of feare and danger and sudden assault of an enimie the cheife milletary commander in every towne shall have power to call the souldiers of that towne together and put them in a posture of warr; whose commands every souldier shall obey for the defence of the Towneship; and they shall follow the directions of the milletary Commander of that Towne in keeping watch and ward. . . .

2. The following regulations were passed by the General Court on August 20, 1643 to approve the selection of officers chosen by the colony's Militia Company and to provide rules for regulating that Company:[2]

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[1] Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., Records of the Colony of New Plymouth (The press of William White, Boston, 1858), XI, 180, 182. (Some selections have been slightly modernized.)

[2] Ibid., II, 61-62.

Officers chosen by the Company and allowed by the Court

That Miles Standish shalbee captain for this yeare.
Nathaniell Thomas leiftennant for this yeare.
Nathaniell Sowther clerk of the band or company.
Mathew Fuller,)
Samuell Nash,)serjeants

Orders

1. That the exercise be alwayes begunn and ended with prayer.

2. That there be one procured to preach them a sermon once a yeare, viz, at the election of their officers, and the first to begin in Septemb^{r} next.

3. That none shalbe received into this military company but such as are of honest and good report, & freemen, not servants, and shalbe well approved by the officers & the whole company.

4. That every person, after they have recorded their names in the military list, shall from tyme to tyme be subject to the commands and orders of the officers of this military company in their places respectively.

5. That every delinquent shalbe punished at the discretion of the officers and the military company, or the major part thereof, according to the order of military discipline & nature of the offence.

6. That all talking, and not keepeing sylence during the tyme of the exercise, jereing, quarrelling, fighting, . . . [shall be punished accordingly].

7. That every man that shalbe absent, except he be sick or some extraordinary occasion or hand of God upon him, shall be fined . . .

8. That if any man shall, upon the dayes appointed, come without his armes or with defective armes, shall . . . [be fined accordingly].

9. That every man that hath entered himself upon the military list, and hath not sufficient armes, & doth not or will not procure them within six monthes next ensuing, his name to be put out of the list.

> 10. That there be but 15 pikes in the whole company . . .
>
> 11. That all that are or shalbe elected cheefe officers in this military company shalbe so titled and forever afterwards be so reputed, except he obtain a higher place.
>
> 12. That every man entered into the military list shall pay [dues for] the use of the company.
>
> 13. That when any of this military company shall die or depart his life, the company, upon warneing, shall come together with their armes, and interr his corps as a souldier, and according to his place and quality.
>
> 14. That all that shalbe admitted into this military company shal first take the oath of fydellyty, if they have not taken it already, or else be not admitted.

3. Between 1636 and 1642 Plymouth's legislature ordered:[3]

> that every person both for him selfe and every man servant keepeth able to bear armes have . . . powder and shott [and] a sufficient muskett or other servicable piece for warr. . . .
>
> that every Township . . . shall keep a barrell of powder and lead or bulletts . . . to bee kept by some trusty man or men in every Towne [so] that it may bee ready for defence in time of need and danger.
>
> that all Smithes within this Government bee compelled to mend and repaire all defective armes brought to them spedily and to bee paid in wheat or butter. . . .
>
> that every Township in this Government . . . shall provide two sufficient fierlocke pieces two swords and two pouches for every thirty men they have in theire towne. . . .

4. The following two provisions adopted by the legislature of Plymouth explain the function of two militia officers:[4]

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[3] Ibid., XI, 181-182.

[4] Ibid., 179, 181.

> Instructions for the Major;
>
> You shall take into your Command the severall Milletary Companies of this Jurisdiction both horse and foot and take care that they bee orderly Trained in the use of armes.
>
> You shall take Care that armes be fix and servicable.
>
> You shall Carefully appoint such watches and Guards as may bee needfull for the honor and safety of the Government;
>
> You shall yearly appoint generall Musters or meetings of such Companies as can with any conveniency meet together and with the advise of your Councell order the same.
>
> Incase of any suddaine and unexpected approach of an enemy or Insurrection . . . you shall endeavor to put those Companies into such a posture of defence; as yourself and such of your Councell of warr shall give your Instruction thereabouts;
>
> You shallbee reddy att all times to observe and execute such further Instructions either respecting disipline or reall service as shall from time to time by the Councell of warr bee directed to you;
>
> You shall on all occasions advise with such as the Councell of Warr shall appoint to bee of your Councell. . . .
>
> The oath of a Clerke of a milletary Company
>
> You shall faithfully serve in the office of a Clerk of the milletary Companie . . . for this present yeare during which time you shall dilligently observe such sett times of training as your officers shall appoint You shall keep an exact list of the Names of your Millitary Companie; and take notice of all such defects as shall arise by the breech of any wholsome orders made by the said Companie; and gather in all such fines as belong therunto and give a Just account thereof to the Companie. . . .

5. Topwide for the selection of militia officers in General Court of Plymouth in 1646 passed laws stating:[5]

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[5] *Ibid.*, 180-181

> That incase any Cheife milletary officer bee wanting in any towne within this Government such Township shall present two or three persons of the fitest they have for that place to the Court; and such person or persons as shalbee approved by the Court shalbee established in such place and office; and such Cheife officer to chose their under officer with the Consent of the body. . . .
>
> that as the Captaine Leiftenant and Ensigne are established in theire places by Authoritie and approval of the Court; soe such Capt: Leiftenant and Ensigne shall not lay downe theire places but by the consent and approval of the Court; upon the penaltie of five pounds for every Captaine fifty shillings for every leiftenant and fifty shillings for every Ensigne soe laying downe his place without the leave and likeing of the Court and if any Captaine leiftenant or Ensigne shall neglect to traine theire men on the days appointed or shalbee negligent in his or theire places . . . shalbee fined ten shillings for every default;
>
> that all such as are chosen Clerke of any milletary Companie of this Jurisdiction shalbee sworne; and any that shall refuse to serve as Clerke for one yeare shalbee fined twenty shillings and hee that is next chosen to have the said sume; . . .

6. When war between England and Holland broke out in 1653, Plymouth feared that the Dutch settlers around New York and Connecticut might attack the English settlements. The General Court passed laws providing:[6]

> First, that the summe of fifty pounds bee raised of the severall townes within the government . . . for the powder and shott, armes and lockes sent out of England . . .
>
> The Court has ordered, that no person within this government shall transport any provisions . . . to either Dutch, French, or other strangers, without license from the Government . . .
>
> That the milletary officers of every companie shall present the defects of the armes of theire companies at the next [meeting of the] Court of Asistants.
>
> That a millitary watch in every towne bee continued until further order to the contrary.

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[6] *Ibid.*, III, 25, 26.

> That all men, though above the age of sixty, bee required . . . to watch according to order, as shalbee agreed upon in each towne, expecting such as through both age and poverty are disabled . . .
>
> The Court recommend to every towne to provide some place or places to retreat unto, that thether they may bring theire wives and children in time of eminent danger, for theire better security.
>
> That every towne that shalbee defective in the want of a drumm att any time for the space of two months shall forfeite the summe of forty shillings to the collonies use. . . .
>
> That a considerable companie of halfe pikes bee provided in every towne, att the charge of the townshipp. . . .
>
> That every towne gat hath over fifty men bearing armes shall have powder answerable to a barrell for every fifty men, and soe bullets proportionable thereunto.
>
> That no man make an allarum without apparent danger. That incase one gun bee shott off in the night, while the millitary watch is kept within any towneshipp, it shalbee taken as an allarum to the said towne, and answered by any man that shall heare the same.
>
> That three guns, or continued shooting, or the beat of a drumm, in the night shalbee an allarum, to be taken from towne to towne.
>
> That incase any towne shalbee destressed by reall assault upon them, such towne as have a certaine intelligence thereof shall afford releife.
>
> That all such as are chosen clerke of any milletary companie shalbee sworne; and any that shall refuse to serve as clark for one yeare to bee fined twenty shillings, and hee that is next chosen and serves to have the said summe.
>
> That one third of every milletary companie shall bring theire armes, with powder and shott, to the meetings on the Lords day, both forenoone and afternoone, [or be fined accordingly]. . . .
>
> In regard of the many appeerances of danger towards the countrey by enimies, and the great necessitie of counsell and advise in that respect, the Court thought it necessary to make choice of a counsell of warr, which accordingly were forthwith orderly elected.

> Theire names are as followeth:--
>
> M^r Bradford, President.
> M^r Prence,
> Capt Standish,
> M^r Hatherley,
> M^r Browne,
> M^r Alden,
> Capt Willett,
> Capt Cudworth,
> Leift Southworth.
>
> These nine, or any three of them, being orderly called together, their acts to be accounted in force, and they to bee continnued in theire places until the next General Court in June. . . . To bee orderly called, is ment being summoned by the president or his deputy; or incase of theire absence, any two magistrates of the counsell of warr.
>
> That the counsell of warr shall have full power to issue out warrents to draft such a number of men in every towne . . . and alsoe to issue forth warrents to the said townes for armes and provission, and all things necessary for them, and what charges shall arise, to bee levied on each towne, proportionably . . . and to give comission to any cheife officer under their charges, either in time of peace or warr. . . .

B. The English Tradition

By and large the New England settlers, the people who settled in Plymouth, were English born and bred. Many of the values, customs and institutions in New England thus reflect those elements in English society. The following selections suggest some of the elements comprising the traditional relationship of civil and military authority in England.

1. In1181 Henry II of England issued "The Assize of Arms," which decreed that:[7]

> [The order required that all who could afford it should own arms and swear to "bear these arms in his service according to his command."]

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[7] Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, eds., Sources of English Constitutional History (Harper and Brothers, New York and London, 1937), 85.

2. In 1572 Queen Elizabeth and Parliament issued "Instructions for General Musters":[8]

> [The instructions contain the statement that the "queen's majesty" requires information on the available military, and further provides that citizens must be armed and trained for defense of the realm. The commissioners must begin with a survey of military inadequacies and subsequently remedy these faults.]

3. On June 7, 1628 Parliament asked Charles I to guarantee to the people of England certain fundamental rights which were enumerated in "The Petition of Right," among them the following clauses:[9]

> And whereas of late great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into divers counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been compelled to receive them into their houses, . . . against the laws and customs of this realm, and to the great grievance and vexation of the people:
>
> And whereas also by authority of Parliament, . . . that . . . , no man ought to be adjudged to death but . . . by the customs of the realm or by Acts of Parliament: . . . nevertheless of late divers commissions under your Majesty's Great Seal have issued forth, by which certain persons have been assigned and appointed Commissioners with power and authority to proceed within the land, according to the justice of martial law against such soldiers and mariners, or other dissolute persons joining with them, as should commit any murder, robbery, felony, mutiny, or other outrage or misdemeanour whatsoever, and by such summary course and order, as is aggreable to martial law, and is used in armies in time of war, to proceed to the trial and condemnation of such offenders, and them to cause to be executed and put to death, according to the law martial. . . . They do therefore humbly pray your Most Excellent Majesty, that no man hereafter . . . in any such manner as is before-mentioned, be imprisoned or detained; and that your

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[8] *Ibid.*, 397-398.

[9] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1899), 68-69.

> Majesty will be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners, [so] that your people may not be so burdened in time to come; and that the foresaid commissions for proceeding by martial law, may be revoked and annulled. . . .

4. In the process of setting up a new government, the Council of the Army in the name of the English people proclaimed on January 15, 1649 "The Agreement of the People," which included the following clause.[10]

> That the Representatives [of Parliament] have, and shall be understood to have the supreme trust in order to the preservation and government of the whole. . . . We do not empower [even] them to impress or constrain any person to serve in foreign war, either by sea or land, nor for any military service within the kingdom; save that they may take order for the forming, training, and exercising of the people in a military way, to be in readiness for resisting of foreign invasions, suppressing of sudden insurrections, or for assisting in execution of the laws; . . . provided, that, even in such cases, none be compellable to go out of the county he lives in, if he procure another to serve in his room. . . .

5. Colonel Richard Ward, who was entrusted with supervising training sessions and musters near London made the following observation in 1639:[11]

> As trainings are now used we shall, I am sure, never be able to make one good soldier; for our custom and use is, nowadays, to cause our companies to meet on a certain day, and by that time the arms be all viewed, and the muster master hath had his pay (which is the chiefest thing many times he looks after) it draws towards dinner time; and, indeed, officers love their bellies so well as that they are loath to take too much pains about disciplining of their soldiers. Wherefore, after a little careless hurrying over of their postures, with which the companies are nothing bettered, they make them

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[10] Ibid., 368-369.

[11] As quoted in C. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (Methuen and Co., London 1902), 9.

> charge their muskets, and so prepare to give their captain a brave volley of shot at his entrance into his inn: where after having solaced themselves for a while after this brave service every man repairs home, and that which is not so well taught them is easily forgotten before the next training. . . .

C. The Colonial Militia in Action

As with any system of defense, the militia as it developed in New England had strengths and weaknesses which in turn reflected the values of the society and the developing practices for dealing with the military. The following selections comment on the militia in action.

1. Baron Von Closen, an aide in the French army contingent serving under Washington, described the reaction of the Boston militia while under naval attack by the British in June, 1778:[12]

> [The writer describes the inexperienced American troops as remarkably orderly and quiet in their preparations for the forthcoming attack, well-disciplined under fire and generally resolute and persevering.]

2. A law adopted in Massachusetts Bay in 1641:[13]

> No man shall be compelled to goe out of the limits of his plantation upon any offensive warres which this Commonwealth or any of our friends or confederates shall volentarily undertake. But only upon such vindictive and defensive warres in our behalf or the behalf of our friends and confederates, as shall be enterprized by the Counsell and consent of a Court generall, as by Authority derived from the Same. . . .

3. When in 1716 the governor of New Hampshire ordered out a militia company to assist the Massachusetts militia in patrolling their common

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[12] Evelyn M. Acomb, ed., The Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig Von Closen (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1958), 68-69.

[13] Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., Records, II, 28.

border, the New Hampshire legislature addressed the following to the governor:[14]

> . . . inasmuch as your Excellency was pleased to order one-third of sd scouts out of this Province, we humbly pray that this may be no precedent for the future; this Province being but ye twelfth part in capacity with the Massachusetts.

4. On April 18, 1775 British regulars under the command of Major Pitcairn marched to Concord, Massachusetts to destroy the military stores which had been collected by the colonists. Although independence had not been declared, the Massachusetts militia under Major John Buttrick attacked the British and killed seventy-three. The militia might have completely wiped out the regulars had it not been for the arrival of reinforcements under Lord Percy with two field pieces.

Lord Percy, who previously had stated that the militia of Massachusetts were cowards, made the following comment after the battle:[15]

> [Lord Percy expresses surprize at both the attack on his army and the perseverance he observed in the American troops.]

5. When Governor Samuel Shute of Massachusetts asked for assistance from the Connecticut militia during Rale's Indian War, 1722-1725, he received the following reply from Connecticut's militia committee:[16]

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[14] Nathaniel Bouton, ed., Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire (Green & Co., Concord and Manchester, 1868), II, 744.

[15] As quoted in Harold Murdock, The Nineteenth of April, 1775 (Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1923), 132.

[16] Hammond Trumbull, ed., The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut (Case, Lockwood and Brainard Co., Hartford, 1857), VI, 235.

> The committee are of opinion that the insults of the Eastern Indians, being comparatively but few in number, is not such an invasion as was understood by his Majesty in his instructions of his Excellency Governor Shute as should call for the assistance of all his Majesties Dominions in North America from New Hampshire to Virginia.

16. In 1683 the General Court of Plymouth investigated the procedure whereby local militia companies chose their own officers and made the following report:[17]

> This Court, taking notice of the neglect of some townes and military companies in not choosing military commanders according to order, therefore orders that, if any towne and military company in the colonie shall neglect to chose a military commander or commanders, the councill of war shall appoint such scommissioners and officers in such townes and companies as they shall judge necessary.

7. In the midst of preparing for an offensive against the French and Indians, the militia council of Plymouth took the following action on May 20, 1690:[18]

> Thomas Thomson, of Middleborough, being impressed for the service at Canada, and refusing to attend that service, is sentenced to pay a fine of four pounds in money to the towne councill or be imprisoned till the same be paid.

8. On June 17, 1775, the Massachusetts militia encountered the British regulars at Bunker Hill. Although the encounter was technically a British success, its effect on morale was that of an American victory. When the colonists realized what heavy losses had been inflicted upon the royal troops by the militia at the battle of Bunker Hill, a wave of enthusiasm swept the American camp.[19]

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[17] Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, Records, VI, 109.

[18] Ibid., VI, 238.

[19] As quoted in Harold Murdock, Bunker Hill (Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1927), 138-139.

> [The section contains various accounts of the battle most of which stress that in one British unit, all but one Captain and seventeen Privates were killed.]

9. In 1666 a legislative investigating committee which had been formed at the urging of military officers in Newport, Rhode Island, issued the following statement.[20]

> The power of judging and taking fines is placed in such person as either cannot or will not perform the same, the neglect of which is likely to cause the ruin of the military exercize throughout the colony....

10. On June 15, 1714, less than one year after the end of Queen Anne's War, the General Assembly of Rhode Island observed that:[21]

> the body of laws for settling and regulating the military forces within this colony are swelled to so large a volume that they do not suit the constitution of the colony and may, in length of time, prove prejudicial to the government if not repealed.

11. The Council of Trade and Plantations in England, which was entrusted with overseeing the American colonies, issued this report on the fortifications and militia of New York in 1703:[22]

> [The report describes the American forts at New York, Albany, Schenectady, Canestigione and Hudson River (Half-Moon) as "in a ruinous condition." Of the four Foot Companies, the writer states that the arms are inadequate in number and in condition, and the men want clothing and supplies.]

12. The Earl of Sandwich, an important English statesman, made the following statement in the House of Commons on February 10, 1775:[23]

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[20] John R. Bartlett, ed., *The Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations* (Brown and Co., Providence, 1857), II, 171-172

[21] *Ibid.*, IV, 172-173.

[22] Cecil, Headlam, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series* (His Majesty's Stationery Office, Hereford, 1913), XXI, 312.

[23] *American Archives: Containing a Documentary History of the English Colonies i North America*, 4th Series (M. St. Clair and Peter Force, Washington, 1837), I, 1681, 1683.

> The noble Lord mentions the impracticability of conquering America; I cannot think the noble Lord can be serious on this matter. Suppose the Colonies do abound in men, what does that signify? They are raw, undisciplined, cowardly men. I whish instead of forty or fifty thousand of these brave fellows they would produce in the field at least two hundred thousand; the more the better, the easier would be the conquest; if they did not run away, they would starve themselves into compliance with our measures. . . . Are these the men to fright us from the post of honour? Believe me, my Lords, the very sound of a cannon would carry them off . . . as fast as their feet could carry them. This is too trifling a part of the argument, to detain your Lordships any longer.

13. Alexander Hamilton, first Secretary of the Treasury, while speaking at the funeral of General Nathaniel Greene in 1790, referred to the militia under Green's command in the Revolutionary War:[24]

> [Hamilton claims that the volunteers who "aided, or rather embarrassed" Greene performed a "mimicry of soldiership" in their defeat of Knyphaussen in Springfield.]

14. Following is a letter written by a surgeon on board one of His Majesty's ships at Boston, May 26, 1775.[25]

> [The writer describes the plentiful provisions of the Americans and emphasizes the bounty of the rum supply. He characterizes the soldiers as drunken, canting, dirty, undisciplined, etc., and predicts that the army will fall apart within three months.]

15. Henry Archer was a native of England who emigrated to America in 1778 and embraced the cause of the colonists in the Revolutionary War. In 1780, at the height of the fighting he wrote a poem entitled "Volunteer Boys."[26]

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[24] Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1962), 333.

[25] Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of Seventy-Six (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., Indianapolis, New York, 1958), I, 152.

[26] Frank Morse, ed., Songs and Ballads of the American Revolution (D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1853), 286-288.

Hence with the lover who sighs o'er his wine
  Cloes and Phillises toasting,
Hence with the slave who will whimper and whine,
  Of ardor and constancy boasting.
    Hence with love's joys
    Follies and noise,
The toast that I give is the Volunteer Boys.

Here's to the soldier, though batter'd in wars,
  And safe to his farm-house retir'd;
When called by his country, ne'er thinks of his scars,
  With ardor to join us inspir'd.
    Bright fame appears,
    Trophies uprear,
To veteran chiefs who become volunteers.

Here's to the farmer who dares to advance
  To harvests of honor with pleasure;
Who with a slave the most skilful in France,
  A sword for his country would measure.
    Hence with cold fear,
    Heroes rise here;
The ploughman is chang'd to the stout volunteer.

Here's to the peer, first in senate and field,
  Whose actions to titles add grace, sir;
Whose spirit undaunted would never yet yield
  To a foe, to a pension or place, sir.
    Gratitude here,
    Toasts to the peer,
Who adds to his titles, "the brave volunteer."

Nobles and beauties and such common toasts,
  Those who admire may drink, sir;
Fill up the glass to the volunteer hosts,
  Who never from danger will shrink, sir.
    Let mirth appear,
    Every heart cheer,
The toast that I give is the brave volunteer.

Here's to the squire who goes on parade
  Here's to the citizen soldier;
Here's to the merchant who fights for his trade,
  Whom danger increasing makes bolder.
    Let mirth appear,
    Union is here,
The toast that I give is the brave volunteer.

Here's to the lawyer, who, leaving the bar,
  Hastens where honor doth lead, sir,

Changing the gown for the ensigns of war,
The cause of his country to plead, sir.
Freedom appears,
Every heart cheers,
And calls for the health of the law volunteers.

Thus the bold bands for old Jersey's defence,
The must hath with rapture review'd, sir;
With our volunteer boys, as our verses commence,
With our volunteer boys they conclude, sir.
Discord or noise,
Ne'er damp our joys,
But health and success to the volunteer boys.

16. Following is an excerpt dated September 27, 1777 from the Journal of the Reverend Dr. Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania:[27]

> [The writer tells of his visit to the Augustus Church for the purpose of burying a child; there he found a regiment of the Pennsylvania militia desecrating the church with its revelry. He rebuked the Colonel in charge who responded that the militia represented several nationalities and could not be controlled.]

17. Frederick Mackenzie, a private in a British regiment fighting in America at the time of the Revolution, made the following entry in his diary on April 24, 1778.[28]

> [The writer records that a "Deserter" reported despair among the American troops. A small body of Continentals supervises the Militia and Volunteers; the latter two groups, lacking necessary clothing and shelter, are tired of the expedition, and want to go home.]

18. From letters of George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of troops during the War of Independence, April 30, 1776, to the New York legislature:[29]

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[27] Theodore G. Toppert and John W. Doberstein, ed., The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg (The Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia, 1958), III, 80. (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, Pa.)

[28] Diary of Frederick Mackenzie (Harvard Univ. Press., Cambridge, 1944), II, 371-372.

[29] John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1932), V, 499.

> [Washington complains of the unreliable militia; if they are raised late they never make it to battle and if raised too soon they tire and go home.]

September 2, 1776, to the president of Congress:[30]

> [Washington reports his distressing situation. Mass desertion among the militia has dispirited the remaining men and Washington confesses his "want of confidence, in the generality of the troops."]

September 24, 1776, to the president of Congress:[31]

> [Washington explains the want of discipline among the militia: many are unfamiliar with arms, unconfident among the better trained, unused to the lodgings, often sick from the change, and strongly desirous of returning home. Their behavior demoralizes the rest of the troops and causes disorder to reign.]

19. In 1701 Edmund Randolph wrote the following report for the Council of Trade and Plantations in England:[32]

> [The account outlines the instruments of defence in the Massachusetts Bay and finds them entirely inadequate.]

20. Judge Samuel Sewall made the following entry in his diary on September 13, 1686:[33]

> The Artillery Company had like to have been broken up; the animosity so high between Charlestown and Cambridge Men about the Place of Training.

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[30] *Ibid.*, VI, 4-5.

[31] *Ibid.*, VI, 110-111.

[32] Cecil Headlam, *Calendar of State Papers*, xXIX, 105.

[33] "The Diary of Samuel Sewall," *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 5th Series (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, 1878), V, 151.

D. The Constitutional Settlement

As the years passed, the English colonies sought to develop their political and economic interests without the supervision of the mother country. England's attempts to tighten its control over the colonies after the conclusion of the French Indian War embittered relations. The decision in 1764 to maintain a standing army in America and to tax the colonists for its support increased tension and caused the colonists to articulate their long held assumptions about the proper place of the military in society.

Once independence was achieved, the need to establish a new government led American statesmen to institutionalize their ideas concerning military-civilian relations in the Constitution of the United States.

The selections in Part C deal with the constitutional question in this period.

1. In 1764 Great Britain decided that it was necessary to maintain a small military force in America for the defense of the colonies. The quartering of part of the British army in Boston led Samuel Adams to write the following article in the Boston Gazette on December 19, 1768:[34]

> The raising and keeping a standing army within the kingdom, in a time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is Against Law. This is a declaration of the Right of every British subject, solemnly recogniz'd by the parliament, immediately after the glorious revolution by William the third. It stands recorded, as one of the first

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[34] Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904), II, 269. (Emphasis in the original.)

> things done, after that friend to the common Rights of mankind, that great deliverer of the nation from popery and slavery, and his royal consort were fixed on the throne: When the constitution was again restored and settled on its own basis, which indeed is the only true basis of all government, the laws of God and nature. For government is an ordinance of Heaven, design'd by the all-benevolent Creator, for the general happiness of his rational creature, man. . . .
>
> Are we a garrison'd town or are we not? If we are, let us know by whose authority and by whose influence we are made so: If not, and I take it for granted we are not, let us then assert & maintain the honor--the dignity of free citizens and place the military, where all other men are, and where they always ought & always will be plac'd in every free country, at the foot of the common law of the land.

2. In September, 1774, the First Continental Congress, attended by representatives from the various colonies, met at Philadelphia to discuss their grievances. The Congress adopted and issued of the "Petition of Congress," excerpts of which follow.[35]

> To the Kings most excellent majesty
>
> Most gracious Sovereign
>
> We your majestys faithful subjects of the colonies of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhode-island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, the counties of New-Castle Kent and Sussex on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, and South Carolina, in behalf of ourselves and the inhabitants of these colonies who have deputed us to represent them in General Congress, by this our humble petition, beg leave to lay our grievances before the throne.
>
> A standing army has been kept in these colonies, ever since the conclusion of the late war, without the consent of our assemblies; and this army with a considerable naval armament has been employed to enforce the collection of taxes.

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[35] Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1904), I, 115-116.

> The Authority of the commander in chief, and, under him, of the brigadiers general has in time of peace, been rendered supreme in all the civil governments in America.
>
> The commander in chief of all your majesty's forces in North-America has, in time of peace, been appointed governor of a colony. . . .

3. On October 29, 1775, as the colonies began preparations for their campaign against the British, Samuel Adams wrote the following letter to Eldridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts to the Continental Congress.[36]

> I wish with you to see our militia formed not only into battalions,, but also brigades. But should we not be cautious of putting them under the direction of the generals of the continent, at least until such a legislative shall be established over all America, as every colony shall consent to?
>
> The continental army is very properly under the direction of the continental congress. Possibly, if ever such a legislative should be formed, it may be proper that the whole military power in every Colony should be under its absolute direction. Be that as it may, will it not till then be prudent that the militia of each colony should be and remain under the sole direction of its own legislative, which is and ought to be the sovereign and uncontrollable power within its own limits or territory? I hope our militia will always be prepared to aid the forces of the continent in this righteous opposition to tyranny. But this ought to be done upon an application to the government of the colony. Your militia is your natural strength, which ought under your own direction to be employed for your own safety and protection. It is a misfortune to a colony to become the seat of war. It is always dangerous to the liberties of the people to have an army stationed among them, over which they have no control. There is at present a necessity for it; the continental army is kept up within our colony, most evidently for our immediate security. But it should be remembered that history affords abundant instances of established armies making themselves the masters of those countries, which they were designed to protect. There may be no danger of this at present, but it should be a caution not to trust the whole military strength of a colony in the hands of commanders independent of its established legislative.

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[36] Harry Alonzo Cushing, The Writings of Samuel Adams, III, 229-230.

4. General George Washington wrote the following letter to the President of the Continental Congress during his April, 1778 campaign against the British:[37]

> [Washington raises the issue of the jealousy felt by Congress toward the army. He calls the sentiment "injurious," "unjustly founded," and "impolite in the extreme." He admits that armies have threatened the civil government else-where but claims that in contrast to these our army will be powerful only in the war time, and then the soldiers will be interested citizens, not mercenaries.]

5. During the last year of the American Revolution, John Adams, then a prominent lawyer and politician in Massachusetts, made the following remark:[38]

> [Adams argues that although expensive, and occasionally unprepared for a battle, the militia will nonetheless be a reliable institution; it will be relatively free from corruption and will acquire the necessary military skills in actual service. Adams wishes that every male citizen were obliged to serve in the military.]

6. Benjamin Franklin wrote the following letter on July 27, 1783, to Sir Joseph Banks, a friend in England.[39]

> I join with you most cordially in rejoicing at the return of peace. I hope it will be lasting, and that mankind will at length, as they call themselves reasonable creatures, have reason and sense enough to settle their differences without cutting throats; for, in my opinion, there never was a good war or a bad peace. What vast additions to the conveniences and comforts of living might mankind have acquired, if the money spent in wars had been employed in works of public utility! What an extension of agriculture, even to the tops of our mountains; what rivers rendered navigable or joined by canals; what bridges, aqueducts, new roads, and other public works, edifices, and improvements, rendering England a complete paradise, might

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[37] John Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, XI, 290-292.

[38] As quoted in Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience (Random House, New York, 1958), 368.

[39] John Bigelow, ed., The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1888), III, 320-321. (Emphasis in the original.)

> have been obtained by spending those millions in doing good, which in the last war have been spent in doing mischief; in bringing misery into thousands of families, and destroying the lives of so many thousands of working people, who might have performed the useful labor!

7. During the American Revolution, the colonies found it necessary to set up a central government to direct the war effort. Thus, the Articles of Confederation, which established a loose confederation of states under a central government, were drawn up and ratified on March 1, 1781. By 1787, however, many Americans had become convinced that the Articles did not provide the basis for a sufficiently strong central government. In the summer of that year delegates from the various states met at Philadelphia to draft a new constitution for the United States. Following are excerpts from the speeches made by some of the delegates as recorded in the Journals of James Madison, a representative from Virginia:[40]

> Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] took notice that there was (no) check here agst. standing armies in time of peace. . . . The people were jealous on this head, and great opposition to the plan would spring from such an omission. . . . He thought an army dangerous in time of peace & could never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number. He proposed that there shall not be kept up in time of peace more than ____ thousand troops. His idea was that the blank should be filled with two or three thousand. . . .
>
> Genl. Pinkey [of South Carolina] asked whether no troops were ever to be raised untill an attack should be made on us?
>
> Mr. Gerry, if there be no restriction, a few States may establish a military Govt.
>
> Mr. Williamson [of North Carolina] reminded him of Mr. Mason's motion for limiting the appropriation of revenue as the best guard in this case.

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[40] Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1911) II, 318-319, 329-332.

Mr. Langdon [of New Hampshire] saw no room for Mr. Gerry's distrust of the Representatives of the people.

Mr. Dayton [of New Jersey said] preparations for war are generally made in peace; and a standing force of some sort may, for ought we know, become unavoidable.

* * *

Mr. Mason [of Virginia] . . . considered uniformity as necessary in the regulation of the Militia throughout the Union.

Genl Pinkney mentioned a case during the war in which a dissimilarity in the militia of different States had produced the most serious mischiefs. Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up a proper discipline of their militia.

Mr. Elseworth [of Connecticut] was for going as far in submitting the militia to the Genl Government as might be necessary, but thought the motion of Mr. Mason went too far. He (moved) that the militia should have the same arms (& exercise and be under rules established by the Genl Govt. when in actual service of the U. States and when States neglect to provide regulations for militia, it shd. be regulated & established by the Legislature of U. S.). The whole authority over the Militia ought by no means to be taken away from the States whose consequence would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice of power. He thought the Genl Authority could not sufficiently pervade the Union for such a purpose, nor could it accommodate itself to the local genius of the people. It must be vain to ask the States to give the Militia out of their hands. . . .

Mr. Dickenson [of Delaware said] We are come now to a most important matter, that of the sword. His opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up all authority over the Militia. He proposed to restrain the general power to one fourth part at a time, which by rotation would discipline the whole Militia.

Mr. Butler urged the necessity of submitting the whole Militia to the general Authority, which had the care of the general defence. . . .

Mr. Madison [of Virginia] thought the regulation of the Militia naturally appertaining to the authority charged with the public defence. It did not seem in its nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities. If the States would trust the Genl. Govt. with a power over the public treasure, they would from the same consideration of necessity grant it the direction of the public force.

> Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting this power [to make war] in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depository, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. . . .
>
> Mr. Butler [of South Carolina]. The Objections agst the Legislature lie in a great degree agst the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it. . . .
>
> Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war. . . .
>
> Mr. Mason was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.

8. In September 1787, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention concluded their discussions. On September 17th, the final draft was signed. Following are excerpts from the Constitution:

> Article I.
>
> Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. . . .
>
> Section 8. The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
>
> To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
>
> To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
>
> To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers; and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. . . .

> Article II.
>
> Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. . . .
>
> Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. . . .

9. Once the Convention had completed its deliberating the final draft was submitted to the various states for ratification. In some states the clauses dealing with the military caused great concern. The following excerpts are drawn from the debates of the convention which was convened in Virginia in June, 1788, to consider ratification of the Constitution:[41]

> Mr. MASON. . . . No man has a greater regard for the military gentlemen than I have. I admire their intrepidity, perseverance, and valor. But when once a standing army is established in any country, the people lose their liberty. When, against a regular and disciplined army, yeomanry are the only defence,--yeomanry, unskilful and unarmed,--what chance is there for preserving freedom? Give me leave to recur to the page of history, to warn you of your present danger. Recollect the history of most nations of the world. What havoc, desolation, and destruction, have been perpetrated by standing armies!
>
> Mr. HENRY. Mr. Chairman, in my judgment the friends of the opposition have to act cautiously. We must make a firm stand before we decide. I was heard to say, a few days ago, that the sword and purse were the two great instruments of government; and I professed great repugnance at parting with the purse, without any control, to the proposed system of government. And now, when we proceed in this formidable compact, and come to the national defence, the sword, I am persuaded we ought to be still more cautious and circumspect; for I feel still more reluctance to surrender this most valuable of rights.

10. Virginia agreed to ratify the Constitution on June 27, 1788, only

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[41] Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, 1859), III, 380, 384.

on the basis that certain conditions be met. Among these were the following.[42]

> 9th. That no standing army, or regular troops, shall be raised, or kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the members present, in both houses.
>
> 10th. That no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then no longer term than the continuance of the war.
>
> 11th. That each state respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, except when in actual service, in time of war, invasion or rebellion; and when not in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject only to such fines, penalties, and punishments, as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own state. . . .

Amendments to the Constitution, adopted 1791:

> Amendment II. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. . . .
>
> Amendment III. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

12. To answer the objections to various Constitutional provisions, such as those raised by Virginia, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison wrote the Federalist Papers. The following is from a paper by Hamilton:[43]

> To the powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, -- that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing

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[42] Ibid., 660.

[43] Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Federalist (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1898), 141-142, 150.

armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations. . . .

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the legislature.

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the Legislature, not in the Executive; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years--a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity. . . .

[Next] I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defence. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.

SECTION III

TWO VOICES FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The early nineteenth century saw the writing of two significant commentaries, one about America and American democracy, the other about the nature of war. Section III contains selections drawn from these two works.

A. Alexis de Tocqueville

Alexis de Tocqueville, a distinguished French scholar and traveler, spent much time in the United States during the early 19th century. He was greatly interested in the growth of American democracy as contrasted with the political developments in the Old World. The following selections are drawn from the American edition of his classic work, *Democracy in America.*

1. On the geographical position of America:[1]

> The most important occurrence which can mark the annals of a people is the breaking out of a war. In war a people struggles with the energy of a single man against foreign nations, in the defence of its very existence. . . .
>
> The only safeguard which the American Union, with all the relative perfection of its laws, possesses against the dissolution which would be produced by a great war, lies in its probably exemption from that calamity. Placed in the centre of an immense continent, which offers a boundless field for human industry, the Union is almost as much insulated from the world as if its frontiers were girt by the ocean.

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[1] Henry Reeves, Esq., trans.; Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Republic of the United States of America* (A. S. Barnes & Co., New York, 1851), I, 181-183, II, 402.

Canada contains only a million of inhabitants, and its population is divided into two inimical nations. The rigor of the climate limits the extension of its territory, and shuts up its ports during the six months of winter. From Canada to the Gulf of Mexico a few savage tribes are to be met with, which retire, perishing in their retreat, before six thousand soldiers. To the south, the union has a point of contact with the empire of Mexico; and it is thence that serious hostilities may one day be expected to arise. But for a long while to come, the uncivilized state of the Mexican community, the depravity of its morals, and its extreme poverty, will prevent that country from ranking high among nations. As for the powers of Europe, they are too distant to be formidable. . . .

The great advantage of the United States does not, then, consist in a federal constitution which allows them to carry on great wars, but in a geographical position, which renders such enterprises improbable. . . .

It would be very difficult to transport and maintain in America more than 25,000 soldiers; an army which may be considered to represent a nation of 2,000,000 of men. The most populous nation of Europe contending in this way against the Union, is in the position of a nation of 2,000,000 of inhabitants at war with one of 12,000,000. Add to this, that America has all its resources within reach, while the European is at 4,000 miles distance from his; and that the immensity of the American continent would of itself present an insurmountable obstacle to its conquest.

2. On democracy and the army:[2]

Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbours: a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants; but this is peculiar to America, not to democracy.

The equality of conditions, and the manners as well as the institutions resulting from it, do not exempt a democratic people from the necessity of standing armies, and their armies always exercise a powerful influence over their fate. It is therefore of singular importance to inquire what are the natural propensities of the men of whom these armies are composed.

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[2] *Ibid.*, II, 280-282, 284-286.

In democratic armies all the soldiers may become officers, which makes the desire of promotion general, and immeasurabl extends the bounds of military ambition.

The officer, on his part, sees nothing which naturally and necessarily stops him at one grade more than at another; and each grade has immense importance in his eyes, because his rank in society almost always depends on his rank in the army. Among democratic nations it often happens that an officer has no property but his pay, and no distinction but that of military honours: consequently as often as his duties change, his fortune changes, and he becomes, as it were, a new man. . . .

In democratic armies the desire of advancement is almost universal: it is ardent, tenacious, perpetual; it is strengthened by all other desires, and only extinguished with life itself. But it is easy to see, that of all armies in the world, those in which advancement must be slowest in time of peace are the armies of democratic countries. As the number of commissions is naturally limited, while the number of competitors is almost unlimited, and as the strict law of equality is over all alike, none can make rapid progress -- many can make no progress at all. Thus the desire of advancement is greater, and the opportunities of advancement fewer, there than elsewhere. All the ambitious spirits of a democratic army are consequently ardently desirous of war, because war makes vacancies, and warrants the violation of that law of seniority which is the sole privilege natural to democracy. . . .

It may therefore be asserted, generally speaking, that if democratic nations are naturally prone to peace from their interests and their propensities, they are constantly drawn to war and revolutions by their armies. Military revolutions, which are scarcely ever to be apprehended in aristocracies, are always to be dreaded among democratic nations. . . .

I foresee that all the military rulers who may rise up in great democratic nations, will find it easier to conquer with their armies, than to make their armies live at peace after conquest. There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult -- to begin a war, and to end it. . . .

I am of opinion that a restless and turbulent spirit is an evil inherent in the very constitution of democratic armies, and beyond hope of cure. The legislators of democracies must not expect to devise any military organization capable by its influence of calming and restraining the military profession: their efforts would exhaust their powers, before the object is attained.

> The remedy for the vices of the army is not to be found in the army itself, but in the country. Democratic nations are naturally afraid of disturbance and of despotism; the object is to turn these natural instincts into well-digested, deliberate, and lasting tastes. When men have at last learned to make a peaceful and profitable use of freedom, and have felt its blessings -- when they have conceived a manly love of order, and have freely submitted themselves to discipline -- these same men, if they follow the profession of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits and manners. The general spirit of the nation being infused into the spirit peculiar to the army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life, or represses them by the mighty force of public opinion. Teach but the citizens to be educated, orderly, firm, and free, the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient.
>
> Any law which, in repressing the turbulent spirit of the army should tend to diminish the spirit of freedom in the nation, and to overshadow the notion of law and right, would defeat its object: it would do much more to favour, than to defeat, the establishment of military tyranny.
>
> After all, and in spite of all precautions, a large army amid a democratic people will always be a source of great danger; the most effectual means of diminishing that danger would be to reduce the army, but this is a remedy which all nations have it not in their power to use.

3. On democracy and war:[3]

> I think it may be admitted as a general and constant rule, that, among civilized nations, the warlike passions will become more rare and less intense in proportion as social conditions shall be more equal.
>
> War is nevertheless an occurrence to which all nations are subject, democratic nations as well as others. . . .
>
> No protracted war can fail to endanger the freedom of a democratic country. Not indeed that after every victory it is to be apprehended that the victorious generals will possess themselves by force of the supreme power, after the manner of Sylla and Caesar: the danger is of another kind. War does not always give over democratic communities to military government,

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[3] *Ibid.*, 280, 285.

> but it must invariably and immeasureably increase the powers of civil government; it must almost compulsorily concentrate the direction of all men and the management of all things in the hands of the administration. If it lead not to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits. All those who seek to destroy the liberties of a democratic nation ought to know that war is the surest and the shortest means to accomplish it. This is the first axiom of the science.

B. Karl von Clausewitz

Karl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military officer, was a professional soldier who saw battle for the first time in 1793 at the age of thirteen. From then until 1815 he gathered an immense amount of practical experience participating in all the wars in which Prussia was involved during the Napoleonic era. Clausewitz's idea on the place of war in society is explained in the following excerpt from his classic, On War:[4]

> [Karl von Clausewitz claims that the political and military forces must fully cooperate to win a war, and that the issue of subordinating one group to the other is meaningless. The art of war he claims "becomes policy . . . which fights battles instead of writing notes."]

SECTION IV

CIVIL SUPREMACY IN THE COLD WAR

Since 1945 two developments have caused the United States great concern, the growth of Communism and the invention of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, our ally in the war against Hitler, profited from the aftermath of that war to spread Communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Since then, the United States has recognized the necessity for maintaining sufficient military strength to meet the Communist threat. At the same time nuclear weapons have greatly increased the potency of the military establishment and its capacity for destruction. This section deals with the implications of the new situation.

A. Growth of Military Power, 1789-1966

Part A presents statistical information which summarizes the specific ways in which the military establishment of the United states has grown since 1789.

1. National Defense Expenditures and Total Budget Expenditures[1]
1789 to 1910



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[1] Based on information in Statistical Abstracts of the U.S.: 1940 (62nd Edit., Washington, D.C., 1941), 168.

2. National Defense Expenditures and Total Budget Expenditures[2]
1915 to 1967



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[2] Based on information in Statistical Abstracts of the U.S.: 1965 (86th edit., Washington, D.C., 1965), 252; Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1940 (62nd edit., Washington, D. C., 1941) 168.

3. Men In Arms 1789-1967[3]

Year	Military Personnel on Active Duty	Total USA Population*	Year	Military Personnel on Active Duty	Total USA Population*
1966	3,093,109		1890	38,666	62,947,714
1962	2,807,819		1880	37,894	50,155,783
1961	2,483,771		1870	50,348	35,558,371
1960	2,476,435	179,323,175	1866	76,749	
1959	2,504,310		1865	1,062,848	
1958	2,000,581		1864	1,031,724	
1957	2,795,798		1863	960,061	
1956	2,806,441		1862	673,124	
1955	2,935,107		1861	217,112	
1954	3,302,104		1860	27,958	31,443,321
1953	3,555,067		1859	28,978	
1952	3,635,912		1850	20,824	23,191,876
1951	3,249,455		1849	23,165	
1950	1,460,261	150,697,361	1848	60,308	
1949	1,615,360		1847	57,761	
1948	1,445,910		1846	39,165	
1947	1,582,999		1845	20,726	
1946	3,030,088		1840	21,616	17,069,453
1945	12,123,455		1830	11,942	12,866,020
1944	11,451,719		1820	15,113	9,638,450
1943	9,044,745		1815	40,885	
1942	3,858,791		1814	46,858	
1941	1,801,101		1813	25,152	
1940	458,365	131,669,275	1812	12,631	
1930	255,648	122,775,046	1811	11,528	
1920	343,302	105,710,620	1810	11,554	7,239,881
1919	1,172,602		1809	12,375	
1918	2,897,167		1808	8,200	
1917	643,833		1807	5,523	
1916	178,376		1806	4,076	
1910	139,344	91,972,266	1801	7,108	5,308,483
1900	125,923	75,994,575	1795	5,296	3,929,214
1898	235,785		1789	718	
1897	43,656				

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*population figures available only every ten years.

[3] Based on information in Historical Statistics of the US Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), 736-737; Historical Statistics of the US Colonial Times to 1957: Continuation to 1962 and Revisions (Washington, D.C., 1965), 103.

4. Number of civilian employees in military departments of the federal government compared with total number of employees of the federal government 1816-1962:[4]

Year	Total Federal Govt. Employees	Civilian Employees in Military Departments of Federal Government
1962	2,514,197	1,069,543
1961	2,435,804	1,042,407
1960	2,398,704	1,047,120
1959	2,382,807	1,078,178
1958	2,382,491	1,097,095
1957	2,417,565	1,160,915
1956	2,398,736	1,179,836
1955	2,397,309	1,186,580
1954	2,407,676	1,208,892
1953	2,558,416	1,332,068
1952	2,600,612	1,337,095
1951	2,482,666	1,235,498
1950	1,960,708	753,149
1949	2,102,109	879,875
1948	2,071,009	870,962
1947	2,111,001	859,142
1946	2,696,529	1,416,225
1945	3,816,310	2,634,575
1944	3,332,356	2,246,454
1943	3,299,414	2,200,064
1942	2,296,384	1,291,093
1941	1,437,682	556,073
1940	1,042,420	256,025
1939	953,891	195,997
1938	882,226	163,457
1937	895,993	160,737
1936	867,432	148,369

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[4] Based on information in *Historical Statistics of the U.S. Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C., 1960), 710; *Historical Statistics of the U.S. Colonial Times to 1957: Continuations to 1962 and Revisions* (Washington, D.C., 1965), 96.

4. (Continued)

Year	Total Federal Govt. Employees	Civilian Employees of Military Departments of Federal Government
1935	780,582	147,188
1934	698,649	133,092
1933	603,587	101,228
1932	605,496	100,420
1931	609,746	107,980
1926	548,713	92,208
1921	561,142	138,293
1920	655,265	237,212
1919	794,271	
1918	854,500	
1917	438,500	91,982
1916	399,381	63,395
1911	395,905	60,283
1901	239,476	44,524
1891	157,442	20,561
1881	100,020	16,297
1871	51,020	1,183
1861	36,672	946
1851	26,274	403
1841	18,038	598
1831	11,491	377
1821	6,914	161
1816	4,837	190

5. Defense Expenditures, Employment, and Procurement Activities,[5] Selected Industries: 1955 to 1964

[In millions of dollars, except employment in thousands. For years ending June 30]

Item	1955	1960	1962	1964
Department of Defense average monthly expenditures:				
Aircraft and missiles	784	775	820	802
Ships	79	145	159	173
Electronics and communications	37	91	95	105
Ordinance, vehicles, and related equipment	99	37	95	133
Average monthly employment:				
Aircraft and parts	761	646	634	606
Ship and boat building and repairing	125	141	141	144
Communications equipment	(NA)	382	445	406
Electronic components and accessories	(NA)	234	266	264
Ordinance	141	202	269	258
Department of Defense obligations for procurement of major equipment	9,800	13,415	16,839	16,505
New Orders received, durable goods industries	155,174	183,718	201,931	227,625
Department of Defense net expenditures for procurement of major equipment	12,838	13,334	14,532	15,351
Shipments, durable goods industries	152,943	187,925	200,428	224,766

NA Not available

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[5] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1965* (86th edit., Washington, D.C., 1965), 256.

6. Defense-Related Employment: 1963[6]

/Includes Alaska and Hawaii. Data estimated. The term "defense-related" covers space and atomic energy work as well as Defense Department functions/

Item	Number (1,000)	Percent
Defense-related employment	6,734	100.00
Federal	3,759	55.8
Military personnel	2,737	40.6
Civilian personnel	1,022	15.2
Department of Defense	979	14.5
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	29	0.4
Atomic Energy Commission	7	0.1
Selective Service Commission	7	0.1
Office of Emergency Planning	(Z)	(Z)
Private industry	2,975	44.2
Transportation equipment	805	12.0
Aircraft and parts	585	8.7
Ship and boat building and repairing	85	1.3
Other transportation equipment	135	2.0
Electrical equip. and supplies	555	8.2
Electronic equipment and components	445	6.6
Other electrical equipment and supplies	110	1.6
Ordinance and accessories	270	4.0
Other industries	1,345	20.0

Z Less than 500 or 0.05 percent.

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[6] *Ibid.*, 256.

7. From an article which appeared on the front page of The New York Times, January 18, 1966:[7]

> [The selection contains the announcement by Secretary of Defence MacNamara that the Defence Department will ask for an increase of 113,000 men for military service and a supplementary defence appropriation of $12.3 billion.]

B. Congress, The Military, and the Bomb

On August 7, 1945 the front page of The New York Times carried banner headlines:[8]

> [The headlines declaim the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.]

The following day brought more of the same:[9]

> [Details of the bombing are reported.]

The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and later on Nagasaki caused destruction and loss of life unequalled in the annals of history. These events were momentous for all mankind, for they signaled both the introduction of a new and devastating type of warfare, and the birth of a new era in international relations.

From the beginning, the Manhattan Project which developed the bomb had been controlled exclusively by the highest echelons of the military. So secret were the operations of the project that even Vice President Harry S. Truman did not know of its existence until he became president in 1945.

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[7] The New York Times, January 18, 1966, 1, 7.

[8] The New York Times, August 7, 1945, 1.

[9] *Ibid*., August 8, 1945, 1.

The detonation of the atomic bombs not only signaled the end of the war but raised the crucial question of how this new and deadly source of power would be controlled. At the international level, protracted negotiations transpired in United Nations as clamor arose from countries all over the world for effective international control of atomic energy. On the national level controversy raged as to who should regulate development of the atom.

1. Throughout the winter of 1945-46 a Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings concerning the question of the future control of atomic power. The hearings lasted for eight months, and hundreds of people from all walks of life were summoned to testify. Henry A. Wallace, who had been Vice-President during Roosevelt's third term, was at the time Secretary of Commerce and a spokesman for the liberal wing at the Democratic Party:[10]

> Secretary WALLACE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you have invited me here today to discuss the several bills before your committee for the domestic control and development of atomic energy. In my judgment there is no more important problem before the Congress. The satisfactory solution of the problems createdby atomic energy will have an important bearing on the future standard of living of the American people and of all the peoples of the world. It may determine whether our civilization and whether the human race itself will continue to exist.
>
> As Secretary of Commerce, I have a particular interest in the parts of these bills which relate to the potential economic uses of atomic power and of byproduct materials. However the several aspects of atomic energy -- domestic and international, economic and military -- are very closely related. Each aspect affects the others to such an extent that the whole problem has to be considered before a satisfactory policy can be worked out with respect to any particular phase. . . .

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[10] *Hearings before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy United States Senate* (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946), 220-224, 238-242, 472-473, 479, 486, 488.

[A] further very important consideration has developed with respect to domestic legislation on atomic fission -- the need for consistency between our domestic policy as established in such legislation and the international policy which the United States has sponsored and which the other members of the United Nations have accepted in principle. That international policy is to bring about as soon as possible agreements among all nations not to develop or use atomic weapons, and to insure that such agreements are effective by backing them up with an international inspection system. We do not yet have such international agreements nor an inspection system, but our domestic legislation must be designed to fit into such arrangements and must not give other nations any reason to doubt that international control is our policy and that we would support that policy wholeheartedly. For example, we would undoubtedly give the other nations of the world reason to distrust our motives if on the international front we advocate a policy designed to prevent war and to prevent the use of atomic energy for military purposes, while we simultaneously place the scientific and technological development of atomic energy in the hands of the military at home. So long as we continue without legislation on this subject, we are doing just that. In the eyes of the world, we are entrusting all of the Nation's activities in the field of atomic energy to the military.

In order to be consistent with the international policy which we have proposed and which offers the only possible alternative to an atomic arms race and ultimate chaos, domestic legislation must be based upon the following principles:

First, it must provide for civilian control in complete harmony with our international policy.

Second, it must provide the basis for a free international exchange of basic scientific information, and for the exchange of technical information when international arrangements make that possible.

Third, it must provide for the early development of the best possible technicians for inspection, which this country can then offer and propose to the United Nations.

I shall now take up in turn each of the . . . principal bills concerned with domestic control and development and consider them in relation to the three standards of conformity with our international policy which have just been enumerated.

First, let us consider the McMahon bill (S. 1717). This bill was introduced after our policy of striving for international control of atomic energy had been formulated by the President and after the initial meeting of the President with the Prime Ministers of Canada and Great Britain. The possibility thus existed of making policy on the so-called domestic aspects of this problem conform to our international policy,aand full advantage was taken of this opportunity. This bill places control of developments within the United States in a full-time, five-member civilian commission responsible to the President. Members of the Commission will be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, and will be removable at the discretion of the President.

These provisions are consistent with our traditions of democracy and would place control of development of this new tremendous force in the hands of agents directly responsible to representatives of the people. Such democratic control and responsibility are essential not only to prevent undesirable forms of authoritarianism or military dictatorship on the domestic front, but also to assure a domestic program consistent with our international policy. Moreover, the bill specifically provides in section 6 that --

"The Commission shall not conduct any research or developmental work in the military application of atomic power if such research or developmental work is contrary to any international agreement of the United States."

The Commission is given custody of all atomic bombs, and is directed not to produce bombs nor to turn any over to the armed forces of the United States except at the express direction of the President. This is a fundamentally important provision which will assure the continuation of our traditional policy of civilian control of military matters. At no time in the history of the United States, in fact, has it been more important to follow the constitutional pattern of subordinating the armed services to civilian representatives of the people.

Secondly, S. 1717 places great emphasis on complete freedom for fundamental scientific research and on the free international exchange of basic scientific information. It provides further, in section 9, that related technical information shall be distributed --

"with the utmost liberality as freely as may be consistent with the foreign and domestic policies established by the President. . . ."

Furthermore, the Commission is not only authorized but is directed to foster and develop economic, medical, and other peaceful uses of the process of atomic fission and byproduct materials resulting therefrom.

Finally, under the complete civilain control and with the close coordination with international policy which the bill provides, it is clear that the Atomic Energy Commission could quickly arrange for the development of the best possible techniques for use in an international inspection system by the scientists, engineers, and technicians acquainted with all phases of the Manhattan project.

The Johnson bill (S. 1463) is defective with respect to all three criteria of consistency with our international program. Since the bill was drafted and introduced before our international policy was clearly formulated in the form of the declaration of the President and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada, it was almost inevitable that this should be the case.

The Johnson bill is essentially a bill for promoting further military developments of atomic power. It turns the entire question of domestic development and use of atomic energy, including military developments and uses, over to a nine-man, part-time Commission and to an Administrator appointed by the Commission. The Commission and the Administrator are given powers which make them largely independent of the President and of the Congress. The Commission members are appointed for 9-year terms, and cannot be removed by the President except on specific limited charges. . . .

The Johnson bill is equally deficient in other respects. The entire emphasis in the bill is on the military application of atomic energy. Little positive encouragement is given to the Commission to sponsor and develop economic, medical and other peaceful uses of atomic power or its byproduct materials. The Commission is left perfectly free to manufacture, or have manufactured by private contractors as many bombs as it may see fit, and there is no specific limitation on the disposition to be made of such bombs. A yearly inventory of property, which presumably would include bombs, is required to be made to the President, but only such parts of that inventory need to be made available to the Congress as the Commission believes to be desirable.

The general statute which prohibits commissioned officers from holding civilian positions is set aside to permit military men on active duty to serve on the Commission, or as Administrator or Deputy administrator. There is also a strange provision in section 3 of the bill which seems to indicate that the draftsman may have contemplated that the Administrator would be an Army officer and the Deputy Administrator a Navy officer. That provision reads as follows:

"the Deputy Administrator shall at all times be kept fully informed by the Administrator."

These provisions potentially place the people of this Nation and even of the world at the complete mercy of a small group of men, perhaps a military clique, who could use this fearful new power to impose new and more terrible forms of authoritarianism and imperialism.

With respect to the second criterion, the bill does not provide for the free dissemination of basic scientific data, nor for the international exchange of technical data, if and when the President finds that international arrangements have progressed to the point where such exchange would be desirable. On the contrary, there is great emphasis on security regulations -- which need not even be made public. There are drastic penalties provided for even unintentional violations of the statute or of security regulations. These provisions indicate again that military applications are the prime consideration of this bill, and under it that wartime security regulation would be carried over into peacetime. . . .

Lastly, under this bill I doubt whether we shall get the scientific and technical collaboration which is necessary to develop, without further delay, the inspection techniques required for effective international control of atomic energy under the United Nations.

It seems to me clear that if S. 1463 or anything like it were enacted by the Congress, it would tremendously increase the difficulties of achieving and successfully administering an international control and inspection system. We would be proposing control and peaceful uses of atomic fission to the world on the one hand, and on the other, we would be turning our domestic development and use over to a virtually independent commission. The commission provided could be dominated and controlled by the armed forces under a statute that emphasize military developments of atomic energy. This is certainly not the way to encourage international cooperation. It is clear that this bill was not drafted to fit into a policy of international control of atomic energy. In order to conform to such a policy this bill will have to be discarded. . . .

Senator HICKENLOOPER [Republican of Iowa]. Mr. Secretary, . . . until the United Nations or the respective nations individually give satisfactory assurances of the outlawing of the atomic power as a weapon, wouldn't it follow that at least our military responsibility should still exercise control over atomic energy as a weapon just as it should in battleships or bombs of lesser power?

Secretary WALLACE. Yes and no. I would advocate very strongly that at the earliest possible moment, the military, for its own sake, place the control of the atomic bomb, or the material out of which the atomic bomb is made, directly under the supervision of the President.

Unless that is done, the United States inevitably will be looked on as potentially the greatest aggressor nation in the world.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will we be looked on as a greater aggressor nation and still maintain the greatest Navy in the world, the greatest air fleet in the world?

Secretary WALLACE. Senator Hickenlooper, these other traditional methods of armament do not have the altogether extraordinary potentialities for destruction of the race that atomic energy has, and I wouldn't put them in the same category at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If I may say, and not be misunderstood, I think I am as zealous to outlaw these things, to keep from killing people, as anybody, so I am not advocating the continuance any longer than necessary.

I admit that atomic energy is spectacular, but it would seem to me that atomic energy is a method of killing, causing death and destruction. It would seem that a 10-ton bomb is a method of causing death and destruction in mass degrees.

Now, I am wondering whether or not the military should not have a substantial, not a controlling but a substantial, voice in this field, which is now entirely devoted to national defense.

True, we have medical possibilities. We have civilian possibilities, but at the moment it is entirely a weapon for national defense, or offense is perhaps a better term.

Until we can be reasonably certain of reliable agreements, or understandings that its use will be outlawed as a weapon, doesn't possibility of its use as a weapon rather demand that we don't just discard it?

Secretary WALLACE. I feel that what you advocate, Senator, inevitably leads to the atomic armaments race which President Truman so vigorously deplored, and that it is absolutely vital to take steps to get it out of the hands of the military.

I think we ought to get it out of the hands of the military at the earliest possible moment, and that we should also press with the greatest possible vigor through the United Nations for the international control and inspection system. Otherwise, there will be suspicions in this country that certain other nations are holding out on the quantity of material which they may have been able to produce.

Undoubtedly they will not have produced more than a small fraction of what we have already produced. The ultimate result of such suspicions is the disaster of an atomic bomb race.

That stand which you advocate seems to me to lead in that direction.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it lead any more in that direction than the maintenance of the greatest Navy in the World, the maintenance of a proposed substantial armed force, such as universal training, the maintenance of the greatest air fleet in the world?

Secretary WALLACE. Very much so, in my opinion; that is, I think the potentialities of atomic energy in this field are enormously greater than any of the means which you have mentioned. . . .

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At this moment, without considering what we may or may not be able to do by way of future agreements, would you care to say how far you would go in disclosure of knowledge, both scientific and technical, in the whole field of atomic energy so far as we know up to and including the discharge of the bomb as a weapon to other nations of the world?

Secretary WALLACE. At this moment, it is obvious that we are not in a position to go very far.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask why?

SECRETARY WALLACE. Simply because we have pending action on the agreement proposed at Moscow between the four powers -- Canada, United States, Britain, and Russia.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, in other words, we haven't yet received or been able to arrive at a satisfactory mutual assurance in connection with the Atomic Energy Commission.

Secretary WALLACE. I am completely in accord with the provisions of the McMahon bill.

I think they fit in admirably with the agreement proposed at Moscow between the four powers. Of course, action hasn't yet been taken; specific action has not yet been taken on those recommendations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There must be some fundamental reason underlying the righteousness of the agreement. In other words, I might assume that we are not in a position to disclose at this moment, because we haven't arrived at reliable or satisfactory understandings, and therefore we should keep this matter somewhat in abeyance and not make full disclosures.

Secretary WALLACE. Of course, what I hope is that a sufficiently satisfactory understanding and inspection system will be developed through the United Nations Organization so that there never will be disclosed any information about the making of bombs; that that will be completely out of the picture; and that there will be free scientific disclosure of the facts that lead to its peacetime use.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am in complete accord with that, but I also believe that it presupposes satisfactory and reliable agreements among nations.

Secretary WALLACE. I think certain other nations will want to have just as much assurance, and the same kind of assurance, we would want in their place that there is no danger of our having any of the material in a position to make atomic bombs once the agreement is arrived at.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Here is the thing that troubles me. Let us suppose we get to the point.

It is our desire or our hope that we don't disclose the techniques of the final stages of the bomb, its detonation, or any of those things. I am wondering if any other nations of this size in the world is going to be satisfied to hear us say, "We will just lock this seventh door here and we alone will have the key; the rest of the nations will stay out of there."

I wonder if they will be satisfied to let us keep and lock up, or attempt to forget the secret of the bomb, yet disclosing at least a substantial portion of the thing.

Secretary WALLACE. I think the answer to your question will be obvious if you will imagine some other nation as having done what we have done, and what we would want under those circumstances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is a troublesome problem as to when, and the extent to which, these things should be retained or given away. . . .

Senator MILLIKIN [Republican of Colorado]. I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, whether inspection as a durable and dependable measure of protection does not in a large measure turn on whether the important nations of the earth really mean it when they say they want peace. In other words, if a nation makes pious proclamations and says it wants peace, while at the same time harbors aggressive designs is there any inspection system that will give us complete protection?

Senator WALLACE. I think that is a scientific problem. Obviously, there must be complete accessibility for inspection committees.

Senator MILLIKIN. But the world is a mighty large place and the aggressor nations have always found means for avoiding the restrictions that have been put upon them. I am just wondering whether we can rely on inspection unless we first have a dependable assurance that we are going to have a world at peace.

Secretary WALLACE. I think you have to have that inspection system in order to have that dependable assurance. I don't think you can have it in any other way.

Senator MILLIKIN. If you had a world in which the nations really mean what they say when they say they want peace, you would not need an inspection system.

Secretary WALLACE. I don't think there is any question about the desire of the various nations for peace. Neither do I think there is any question about the types of fears that exist in the various nations which make for war. The nations do want peace, every one of them.

Senator MILLIKIN. You believe that we are now off on a dependable course toward peace?

Secretary WALLACE. That depends in considerable measure on the action this committee takes.

Senator MILLIKIN. Wou you make it "exclusively" of just as you said "in considerable measure"?

Secretary WALLACE. In considerable measure.

Secretary MILLIKIN. Since we have dropped or actually used these bombs, there are symptoms around the world, Mr. Secretary, that indicate that aggression has not lost its popularity.

Secretary WALLACE. You can find symptoms of aggression everywhere, Senator. No nation has an exclusive right to harbor certain types of aggression.

Senator MILLIKIN. And no one has related those aggressions to the fact that we have the atomic bomb. They went on before, and they have been going on since.

Basic to that, does not the whole job of this committee and of the Congress swing more or less on its judgment -- no matter what its judgment may be one way or the other -- as to whether we have now entered a period of peace on which we can rely?

Secretary WALLACE. Well, every nation asks concerning every other nation's intention at the present time.

Senator MILLIKIN. We did that before World War I. We did that at the Disarmament Conference. We did that in connectionn with the Kellogg Pact, and that inquiry has not produced peace.

Secretary WALLACE. But you have now introduced into the world something altogether new, something altogether frightening, something altogether fearful that is not just another type of big bomb.

The possibilities of invention in this field are so great, and the first bombs in this field are so tiny compared with their potentialities. The leading scientists of the leading nations of the world know this and have communicated these truths to the heads of these nations. All thoughtful people of any scientific knowledge whatsoever in positions of authority know that this is not merely a repetition of ancient history, but that we are confronting something altogether new, out of which we can make, if we use our heads and imagination, a durable peace or out of which we can make an atomic-bomb race, fear, hatred, and the destruction of humanity.

Senator MILLIKIN. I agree with the latter part of your statement, but I invite your attention to the fact that, despite our development of this new magnitude of power, some of the nations have gone on planting seeds of war in this earth.

Secretary WALLACE. Well, let him that hath complete virtue throw the first stone on that front.

Senator MILLIKEN. We have already thrown the stone; we threw the stone at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, may I suggest this: We have this bomb, which is a great weapon. We may propose to demonstrate our good faith and our desire for peace with the rest of the world by even perhaps abandoning its manufacture as a weapon and placing the control of atomic energy in a civilian group.

It certainly has its arguments and its support. We would do that; we would abandon the bomb as a weapon, I take it, at this time as a gesture toward peace and as a demonstration to other nations of the world that we do not desire to go on a program of aggression or to go on a theory of enlarged war in the future.

Secretary WALLACE. That doesn't follow from the McMahon bill.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No. I am not necessarily talking about the McMahon bill; I am talking about the philosophy of ridding ourselves, if possible, either upon agreement or otherwise, from the use of that weapon in the hope that the rest of the world will dispense with it.

Secretary WALLACE. That will depend upon the discussions in the international field.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But it would be desirable, as I understand it, and would be a demonstration to the world if, as, and when we can adopt that philosophy of outlawing it as a weapon. That seems to have run all through the testimony of the various witnesses here. I am wondering what effect it would have on the world if today we arrived at some agreements that were satisfactory, at least satisfied us to the point where we could say we would stop making the bomb and no other nation is going to make it, and yet turn around a day or two later and establish a program of universal military training in this country which is certainly not traditional with this Nation.

What kind of a demonstration to the world would that be of our peaceful intentions?

Secretary WALLACE. I am as much concerned as the Senator with the conflict in attitude when that day comes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, it seems to me we would be putting a knife away with one hand and pulling a pistol out with the other, perhaps, if we are trying to demonstrate our peaceful intentions and our desire for a peaceful world. It would seem to me the retention or abandonment of either of those might be well argued by other nations as a demonstration either for or against a policy of war in the future as contrasted to a policy of peace.

* * * * *

Senator VANDENBERG [Republican of Michigan, a former isolationist who became the Party's leading spokesman for the internationalist viewpoint]. Does your idea of this nine-man Commission contemplate that it is totally civilian, or are the services represented?

General GROVES [Head of the Manhattan Project]. I felt that the services would have to be represented, and I think that primarily for this reason, that at the present time this is the most powerful military weapon in existence. It is a weapon which can control all future warfare and can spell defeat or victory for a nation and I felt that, until a time should be reached when we knew that the thing could be controlled and could be inspected and could be handled so that we knew we would never be subjected to an attack by this weapon, the Army and Navy would have to be represented.

THE CHAIRMAN. You mean on the Commission itself.

General GROVES. On the Commission itself, or in some capacity that would insure that the Army and Navy views were not overlooked.

THE CHAIRMAN. General, I take it, when you say service representation you mean service personnel, not the Secretary of War?

General GROVES. I do not mean a civilian head of a department and I do not mean a man who has to go to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff to be told how to vote on anything. In other words, what I want, and feel is absolutely essential, is a man who has the background and who is not going to forget for one minute that, as long as this is a prime, or the prime, military weapon fof the country, defense must come first and other things will have to come afterward until the international situation is resolved so that we do not have to worry about this as a military weapon.

Senator MILLIKIN. Do you think, General, that the bill that comes out of this committee should conform itself to the fact that the weapon angle of it is the predominant angle at the present time?

General GROVES. I think so, but I do believe that the bill as it comes out should recognize that while it is a predominant angle at this time, we are prepared for the future and not intimate to anyone that we are thinking of this only as a weapon.

Senator MILLIKIN. That would be a matter of mechanics?

General GROVES. I think it is a matter of wording the bill so that it is clear that we are not as a Nation embarking on a policy that we are going to have this as a weapon for all time and that is all we are interested in.

My view is that we are interested in it as a weapon as long as we have to be, and on the day when we can say we can't forget this as a weapon, that will be fine.

Senator MILLIKIN. You agree that the weapon is the predominant thing at the present time?

General GROVES. At the present time; yes, sir.

Senator MILLIKIN. Do you see anything on the horizon that leads us to believe that within, say, a year or two it will lose its predominancy?

General GROVES. As a weapon?

Senator MILLIKIN. As a weapon.

General GROVES. No, sir; I cannot see anything.

You are thinking, I suppose, primarily of defense against this, and I see nothing, and I have yet to be told by anyone in whom I have any scientific confidence that there is any possible angle which could be attacked that might result in a defense.

Senator MILLIKIN. Aside from the defense angle, that is, a specific defense to this specific weapon, do you see anything in the world situation that leads us to believe that we may get into such a state of stable peace within the next year or two that we could shift the predominancy of the energy from a war weapon to that of peacetime exploitation?

General GROVES. I don't believe that we can ever shift from the predominancy of this as a war weapon so long as we are unable to make certain that there will be no war.

Senator MILLIKIN. Then, until that time the bill, in your judgment, should reflect that fact?

General GROVES. Yes, sir. . . .

If there is no provision adopted which includes men with military experience -- and I mean by that long military experience, not just the experience of serving in either this war or the last -- I believe that something should be done to correct anything which excludes the armed forces.

We have talked a lot about unification of the armed forces, and yet if this is done we would take the controlling weapon, you might say, certainly the controlling weapon of a surprise attack, and divorce it from the armed services and say that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations will have nothing whatsoever to do with it excepting insofar as this Commission permits them to. I think that means that if any such bill is adopted which does not include men with military background on the Commission, the Commission should be directed by law to submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff all matters of policy prior to adoption and before publication.

In the event that the Joint Chiefs do not concur in such policies, I think they should be submitted to the President for decision. I think it should also direct continuous consultation and maintenance of liaison with the War and Navy Departments on all matters of security, military research, and military applications of atomic energy and development, manufacture, storage, and use of atomic bombs. . . .

Senator MILLIKIN. At the present time we have a civilian as Commander in Chief, and we have civilians as Secretaries of War and Navy. They are a part of the hierarchy of military control and have definite positions of responsibility in that hierarchy.

The thought keeps nagging at me that we are setting up something entirely new in having an independent outside body entirely controlled by civilians determinging the military security and secrecy of this country.

General GROVES. Well, that is why I would like to see this reference to the joint chiefs which, in addition to the chiefs, you might say, of ground, sea, and air, includes the Chief of Staff to the President himself, so that you are getting the representation there of the people who are really unifying the military defense.

Senator MILLIKIN. Isn't that another way of saying that as long as the energy as a military weapon continues to be predominant, regardless of the mechanics we adopt in the bill the military must keep its hands on it?

General GROVES. I think it has got to keep its hands on the part that is necessary for national defense, and that they should be overruled on matters of policy only by the man at the President, who is after all the man who is responsible for the defense of the United States.

Senator AUSTIN [Republican of Vermont]. That point is very well taken, I think, and probably should be considered if we consider that unification is to be considered in any such legislation. . . .

Senator MILLIKIN. General, do you believe that a civilian commission or a predominantly civilian commission should have the power to tell our military forces how many bombs to make, how many bombs to keep, how to make them, where to keep them, or what to do with them?

General GROVES. No, sir; I think that that would fall into the classification of policy, and would have to receive the approval of the joint chiefs of staff, and certainly if a commission attempted to dictate as to where these would be kept, or anything of that kind, and overrule the wishes of the joint chiefs, I think there would have to be a decision by the President and one that would upset some of the decisions of the Commission.

Senator MILLIKIN. So that legislation on the subject eventually would have to have a view to the military problem of the nature that I have described?

General GROVES. Yes, sir; and I think I read earlier in the hearing my views on how the Joint Chiefs of Staff would come in and would solve that problem satisfactorily. In other words, the joint chiefs would have to have presented to them the policies that affected such matters; in other words, anything affecting the military would have to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It certainly would be something that they would be very invitally interested in if a decision were made to stop producing all active material, for example, because that of itself would definitely limit the number of bombs that might be available.

THE CHAIRMAN [McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut]. General, assuming we had a nine-man commission made up of five civilians and four military men, a part-time commission, would you have the military men vote on questions of peacetime uses and applications of atomic energy?

General GROVES. Oh, by all means. They would be full members of the Commission.

THE CHAIRMAN. What special qualifications would you think the military might have to run the civilian end of the matter?

General GROVES. Well, I think I will put it this way: If you try to take the Commission and say an individual member will not vote unless he is a specialist on that problem, you would never be able to get a full vote of the Commission. For example, if a legal matter came up and there happened to be one lawyer on the Commission, he would decide that; and in the same way you might say, "Why should an academic scientist vote when it came to industrial operations?"

It is getting out of his field, but by service on this Commission I feel that all of these men would be broadened, tremendously as the years went on, and each year they would have a better viewpoint on the rest of it.

2. An editorial from The New York Times, March 1, 1946:[11]

[The selection reports the Administrative support of Senator McMahon's bill for the control of atomic energy. The need for representation of the army on the commission is cited. This bill effectively takes the control from the military, in contrast to the May-Johnson proposal. The writer contends that the military must have at least some direct representation on the commission.]

3. From the front page of The New York Times, June 2, 1946:[12]

[The article reports that the McMahon bill was quickly approved in the Senate and sent to the House.]

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[11] The New York Times, March 1, 1946, 20.

[12] Ibid., June 2, 1946, 1.

4. From the front page of The New York Times, July 21, 1946:[13]

> [Details are given of the history of the bill in the Senate, and House amendments are explained. The House is reported as passing the McMahon bill with its original provisions for giving the military a strong voice in the commission. The writer foresees a battle between House and Senate conferees.]

5. From the front page of The New York Times, August 2, 1946:[14]

> [The final bill signed by President Truman provides for a commission of five, all of whom are to be civilians.]

C. The President and the General in Korea

On June 25, 1950, Russian-trained North Korean armies invaded South Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations found North Korea guilty of a breach of peace and asked member nations to aid South Korea. The United States responded to the appeal, and thereafter carried the burden of the war. On July 8, 1950, the United States commander in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, was appointed commander-in-chief of UN forces. At the same time orders were given in Washington that air and naval forces were to be limited to South Korea. China, Manchuria, and Russia were not to be bombed.

After initial Communist successes, General MacArthur engineered a brilliant surprise landing behind Communist lines at Inchon. On September 27, 1950 Truman ordered MacArthur to destroy the North Korean armed forces. To facilitate this objective the General was allowed to carry military operations north of the 38th parallel providing that no Soviet or Chinese forces had entered North Korea. United Nations' troops swept northward toward the Yalu River, the boundary between Korea and Manchuria.

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[13] *Ibid.*, July 21, 1946, 1, 18.

[14] *Ibid.*, August 2, 1946, 1.

1. In November, 1950, Red Chinese "volunteers" poured across the Yalu, driving the U.N. forces back well below the 38th parallel. In the face of this new development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur the following order on December 19:[15]

> If with present U.N. strength successful resistance at some position in Korea without our incurring serious losses could be accomplished and apparent military and political prestige of Communist China could be deflated, it would be of great importance to our National interests. In the face of increased threat of general war JCS believe commitment of additional United States ground forces in Korea should not be made since our views are that major war should not be fought in Korea. . . . If Chinese Communists retain force capability of forcing evacuation after having driven U.N. forces to rear it would be necessary to direct commencement of your withdrawal. . . .

2. MacArthur's reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 29, 1950:[16]

> On 30 December 1950, CINFE [MacArthur] made a comprehensive reply to the request for his comments on the evacuation of United Nations armed forces from Korea. He pointed out that United States naval and air potential was being only partly utilized and that the potential of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and guerrilla action on the mainland were being ignored.
>
> Further, were the Government to make a political determination to recognize the state of war forced upon the United States by China and to take appropriate retaliatory measures, the United States could--

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[15] Hearings before the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (G.P.O., Washington, D.C., 1951), 2179-2180. (Cited henceforth in this section as Hearings.)

[16] Ibid., 2180.

a. Blockade the coast of China;
b. Destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war;
c. Secure appropriate reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa; and
d. Release existing restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, January 9, 1951:[17]

This replies to your recommendations:

Careful consideration still being given to measures of retaliation you suggested. Contribution to general situation resulting from drawing of Chinese Communists into Korea is fully appreciated.

The following points must be accepted on the basis of consideration of the over-all situation:

(a) Strengthening of our effort in Korea does not appear justified on the basis of any change in policy or other eventuality outside of Korea.

(b) United Nations concurrence would be necessary and, in particular, negotiations with the British would be required on the question of blockade. Hong Kong position and extent of Chinese Communist trade with British would be involved. Evacuation from Korea by our forces, or stabilization of our position in Korea, would be required before naval blockade of China coast could be undertaken.

(c) Decision of attack objectives oin Communist China with naval and air forces must await attack outside of Korea on UN forces by Chinese Communists, since only in that eventuality could authorization be obtained.

(d) In view of probable greater usefulness elsewhere and unlikeliness of effect on Korean outcome which would be decisive, use in Korea of Chinese Nationalists from Formosa not favored.

(e) In event stabilization in Korea not feasible, security of Japan must be served by portion of the forces which may be evacuated from Korea. If stabilization in Korea without com-

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[1] *Ibid.*, 332-333.

mitment of additional forces can be accomplished, deployment of two National Guard divisions partly trained may be expected.

(f) Intensification of economic blockade of Chinese trade being pressed.

4. Statement by MacArthur, March 24, 1951:[18]

> Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.
>
> The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.
>
> These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.
>
> The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
>
> Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

5. President Truman's reaction to that statement:[19]

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[18] *Ibid.*, 3181.

[19] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Signet Book: The New American Library, New York, 1965), II, 501-504.

> [Truman criticized MacArthur for ignoring directives to refrain from discussing foreign policy, for challenging the President's authority under the Constitution and for flouting U.N. policy. The President announced that he could not allow such insubordination and explained that although he respected MacArthur as a soldier, he could not permit him to influence political and diplomatic spheres. Truman claimed that military training is poor preparation for political activity and that ultimately the military faction must be subordinate to civilian control.]

6. After consulting with his Cabinet President Truman called a special news conference for 1 a.m., April 11, at which time he made the following announcement:[20]

> [Truman relieves General MacArthur of command of the Far East and designates General Ridgway as his replacement. The President explained that the Constitution requires that the military obey commands issued according to law and that, despite national gratitude owed MacArthur, Truman must remove him from command.]

7. On April 13, 1951 Representative Busbey of Illinois asked that a sampling of some of the remarks he had received from the citizens of Chicago concerning General MacArthur's dismissal be recorded in the _Congressional Record_. Following are some of those remarks.[21]

> MacArthur dismissal tragic almost unbelievable. Looks like Russian victory from inside Washington. Please protest out loud. Need your help.
>
> Urge impeachment of Trumanand Congressional investigation of [Secretary of State] Acheson. Please notice Communist approval of Truman's base action.
>
> Truman-Acheson policy of appeasement must be stopped. Impeachments imperative.
>
> So the best general in the world gets fired by the worst President in the world. Nice knowing that we have so many Representatives in Washington that really believe in protecting the American way of life.

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[20] _Ibid._, II, 509.

[21] _Congressional Record_, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., XCVII, A2049-A2050.

> The deplorable lack of firm and moral leadership is a national disgrace. Congress must take over the leadership immediately, and if necessary start impeachment proceedings.
>
> Shocking isn't it. A great American like General MacArthur treated so terribly by the little men in high places in Washington.
>
> The men who have fought and died in the Pacific have died in vain. Throw off the British yoke. Restore MacArthur. Oust the State Department crowd. Do it now.
>
> Harry had his inning. See that Mac gets to bat.
>
> When an ex-National Guard captain fires a 5-star general impeachment of the National Guard captain is in order.
>
> Truman has again proven his inability to think clearly or act wisely. Unless he is removed from office promptly we are facing a tragic future.
>
> Please register protest to blundering Truman policies in foreign affairs and especially to the MacArthur removal.
>
> MacArthur dismissal is the most disgraceful act in American history.
>
> You must realize that the latest outrageous act of the President and his cohorts is more than the American people can stomach.

8. General MacArthur's return to the United States from Korea received prominent coverage from newspapers throughout the United States. On April 18, 1951 The New York Times carried banner headlines:[22]

> [The headlines report an enthusiastic popular welcome for MacArthur on his return from the Far East.]

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[22] The New York Times, April 18, 1951, 1.

Again on April 19:[23]

> [Additional enthusiastic demonstrations and MacArthur's response are reported.]

On April 21, The New York Times reported MacArthur's arrival in New York:[24]

> [A warm welcome for MacArthur in Manhatten is described. Record crowds were out.]

And also on page one:[25]

> [The article reports that Truman was "booed" as he entered the ball park to begin the season's first game.]

9. Truman's dismissal of MacArthur prompted the Senate to investigate the entire conduct of affairs in the Far East. The Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations conducted Joint Hearings beginning on May 3, 1951:[26]

> I am under no illusion that our present strategy of using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism is a guarantee that a world war will not be thrust upon us. But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power, is one which we believe we must continue to follow.
>
> As long as we keep the conflict within its present scope, we are holding to a minimum the forces we must commit and tie down.
>
> The strategic alternative, enlargement of the war in Korea to include Red China, would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged to put a single man into the conflict.

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[23] Ibid., April 19, 1951, 1.

[24] Ibid., April 21, 1951, 1.

[25] Ibid.,

[26] Hearings, 45, 82-83, 289, 730-733.

Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war. The course of action often described as a "limited war" with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.

Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.

There are also those who deplore the present military situation in Korea and urge us to engage Red China in a larger war to solve this problem. Taking on Red China is not a decisive move, does not guarantee the end of the war in Korea, and may not bring China to her knees. . . . My own feeling is to avoid such an engagement if possible because victory in Korea would not be assured and victory over Red China would be many years away. We believe that every effort should be made to settle the present conflict without extending it outside Korea. If this proves to be impossible, then other measures may have to be taken.

In my consideration of this viewpoint, I am going back to the basic objective of the American people -- as much peace as we can gain without appeasement.

* * * * *

Senator GREEN [Democrat of Rhode Island questioning General MacArthur]. There is one other phase to the question which applies to both Korea and China, which you touched upon, and that is this: You have dealt with these questions in both countries on a purely military basis. But isn't our Government required to give consideration and decide upon it on both a military and a political basis? Can you separate them so distinctly and say that a military victory is a political victory?

General MACARTHUR. I think that it is quite impossible to draw a line of differentiation and say this is a political and this is a military situation.

The American Government should have such coordination so that the political and military are in coordination.

The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control, the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economic-ally, and militarily. You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once employed of the political commissar, who would run the military as well as the politics of the country.

Now, the differentiation that exists between the political features and the military features, I am not able to discuss because I have not been here in Washington. Others will be able to tell you more about that than I, but I do unquestionably state that when men become locked in battle, that there should be no artifice under the name of politics, which should handicap your own men, decrease their chances for winning, and increase their losses.

Senator GREEN. Well, but the point is a little different from that. A military victory, a quick military victory, does not necessarily mean anything but the defeat and disintegration of the armies, but it does not affect the population. If you would defeat the Communist armies, it does not necessarily mean that you can defeat communism in China.

General MACARTHUR. Senator, as far as the United Nations in Korea is concerned, it is limited to Korea. They are trying to clear Korea. I don't understand that in any decisions or discussions that have arisen we are trying to do more than stop the Chinese from aggression in Korea. I believe when we do that we have to put sufficient military forces upon them to do it.

I do not believe we can put that sufficient military force upon them if we limit ourselves to the inhibitions we do now, just in the area of Korea. I believe the minute that we put those pressures on them that the Red Chinese, if they have any sensibilities of discretion at all, would enter into a cease-fire parley.

* * * * *

General MACARTHUR. I shrink with a horror that I cannot express in words -- at this continuous slaughter of men in Korea.

The battle casualties in Korea today probably have passed the million-man mark. Our own casualties, American casualties, have passed 65,000. The Koreans have lost about 140,000. Our losses, on our side, are a quarter of a million men. I am not talking of the civilian populations, who must have lost many, many, many times that.

The enemy probably has lost 750,000 casualties. There are 145,000 of them that are now in our prison bull pens, prisoners, so they might be excepted from that figure because they live; but a million men in less than 11 months of fighting, in less than 11 months of this conflict, have already gone and it grown more savage every day.

I just cannot brush that off as a Korean skirmish. I believe that is something of such tremendous importance that it must be solved, and it cannot be solved by the nebulous process of saying "Give us time, and we will be prepared; or we will be in a better shape 2 years from now" -- which is argumentative.

I don't know whether we will, or not; and neither do you, because you do not know, and none of us know the capacity of the enemy.

He may build faster than we do. I couldn't tell you.

I don't know that, you are gambling on chances; but I say there is no chance in Korea, because it is a fact -- you have lost a million men now. You will lose more than a million if you go on another year; if you go on until 1953, you will lose another million.

What are you trying to protect?

The war in Korea has already almost destroyed that nation of 20,000,000 people.

I have never seen such devastation.

I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited. . . .

What are you going to do? Once more, I repeat the question, What is the policy in Korea?

If you go on indefinitely, you are perpetuating a slaughter such as I have never heard of in the history of mankind.

Now, what I am trying to do is to find some reasonable and honorable way to stop that slaughter. It is not to conquer this country, or China, or anything else.

It is to bring this thing to an honorable end.

If you go on, you are going to destroy not only the casualties that I speak of, which are military, but you are going to destroy that people.

Now, I just cannot bring myself to analyze it with that shrewdness of legal capacity that you enunciate in your argument, which is an argument, to let it by.

Your entire drift has been not to do anything, just keep on fighting, losing and bleeding there; and I think we should make someextraordinary effort to bring it to an end.

Senator KNOWLAND [Republican of California serving as Minority Leader in the Senate]. General, directing your attention to the New York Times of this morning, Saturday, May 5, there is an editorial, a lead editorial, which appears under the heading "The Basic Disagreement," and paragraph 2 thereof reads as follows, and I quote:

"General MacArthur advances the thesis that once war has broken out the balance of control must be put in the hands of the military; and that no political considerations should handicap the latter in winning such a war; while the administration holds that in peace or war, the civil government remains supreme."

Now, my interpretation, and I want to check with you on your testimony, was that you made the observation that wars break out when diplomatic means fail. You did not question the supremacy of the civil authority, either in peace or war, but you did make the point that once the military were given the job of making war, that in that particular field they should not be interfered with in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

Now, am I substantially correct in my interpretation?

General MACARTHUR. The statement -- the interpretation of the New York Times is completely slanted.

At no time in our system of government is there any question of the civil administration being in complete control.

What I said was meant to convey the idea that there should be no non-professional interference in the handling of troops in a campaign.

You have professionals to do that job, and they should be permitted to do it; and that there should not be a political commissar system -- if I could use those words -- which would dictate professional subjects which involve the lives of men when war has been engaged in.

Any idea that a military commander in any position would possess authority over the civil functions of this Government is a treasonable concept in my mind.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was my --

General MACARTHUR (interposing). And I don't know of any reasonable man in the whole history of our country who had advanced any such silly idea. Whoever wrote that article was either completely biased or he ought to have his head examined.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was my interpretation of your testimony, and I thought in fairness to you and to the country that it should be clarified because these things are oftentimes picked up and repeated and then misconceptions get abroad which I was quite sure did not represent your testimony as I listened to it here the other day.

General OMAR BRADLEY [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am one of the military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. I pass on to them the collective advice and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff express their opinion on a subject, it is from the military point of view, and is given with a full realization that considerations other than military may be overriding in making the final decision. The relative importance of the military aspect varies. In some cases it is greatly overshadowed by other considerations. In other cases, the military aspects may be the decisive ones.

When all these aspects are considered the Government's policy is determined. As military men we then abide by the decision.

Before your interrogation on the details of our Government's policies in Korea and the Far East, I would like to ask myself this question: What is the great issue at stake in this hearing?

Principally I would say that you are trying to determine the course we should follow as the best road to peace. There are military factors which must be evaluated before a sound decision can be made. At present the issue is obscured in the public mind by many details which do not relate to the task of keeping the peace and making America secure.

The fundamental military issue that has arisen is whether to increase the risk of a global war by taking additional measures that are open to the United States and its allies. We now have a localized conflict in Korea. Some of the military measures under discussion might well place the United States in the position of responsibility for broadening the war and at the same time losing most if not all of our allies.

General MacArthur has stated that there are certain additional measures which can and should be taken, and that by so doing no unacceptable increased risk of global war will result.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these same measures do increase the risk of global war and that such a risk should not be taken unnecessarily. At the same time we recognize the military advantages that might accrue to the United Nations' position in Korea and to the United States position in the Far East by these measures. While a field commander very properly estimates his needs from the viewpoint of operations in his own

> theater or sphere of action, those responsible for higher direction must necessarily base their actions on broader aspects, and on the needs, actual or prospective, of several theaters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view of their global responsibilities and their perspective with respect to the world-wide strategic situation, are in a better position than is any single theater commander to assess the risk of general war. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are best able to judge our own military resources with which to meet that risk.

10. General MacArthur speaking before the Massachusetts Legislature on July 26:[27]

> [MacArthur finds "dangerous" the proposition that armed forces owe loyalty to the current Chief Executive rather than to the Constitution and the people.]

D. How Much is Too Much?

Traditionally, Congressional control of the military establishment has rested with the "power of the purse." The cost of developing and maintaining a huge military establishment is now approaching sixty billion dollars a year, over half of the federal budget. The following documents raise the question of the impact of this huge expenditure on the ability of Congress to exercise this control.

1. Representative Clare Hoffman of Michigan speaking in Congress on July 19, 1947:[28]

> We have one-hundred-and-seventy-odd committees, joint committees of the Army and Navy trying to coordinate, trying

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[27] *The New York Times*, July 26, 1951, 12.

[28] *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., XCIII, 9434.

> to get away from the waste and extravagence which is always present and which is inevitable when either the Army or the Navy plans a war. No one criticizes them for it. For myself, if they ask for $5, and I am assured $2 of it will be wasted, nevertheless I would vote for the five and so would the other members of the Congress, because we do not dare to take a chance, and we do not know the exact amount they may need.

2. Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a member of the Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee, speaking in Congress.[29]

> [The Senator observes that men are more willing to spend for destruction, for arms and the like, than they are to provide for housing and public health.]

3. Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, speaking at the University of North Carolina, April 6, 1964:[30]

> [Senator Fulbright points to the need to question defense expenditures. He laments that welfare and education proposals costing a tiny fraction of the defense budget are often severely curtailed while few demand a justification for huge outlays for defense. Those voters, increasing in number, whose jobs depend on defense contracts naturally condone Congressional spending in this area. The rest of the popular and Congressional shrinking from this responsibility to question the military budget is unaccountable, and could result in the eventual loss of control over the military establishment.]

4. From The New York Times, March 16, 1964:[31]

> [The article reports complaints of excessive defense spending. Senator Allott, a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, is reported as having been shocked to discover that an airplane, the A-11, had been developed at a cost of $50 to $100 million without his knowledge. He questioned the methods of appropriation which could allow defense officials to "hide this much money."]

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[29] As quoted in William Proxmire, "Spendthrifts for Defence," The Nation, CXCV (August 25, 1962), 65-66.

[30] The New York Times, April 6, 1964, 16.

[31] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1964, 24.

5. From The New York Times, April 23, 1964:[32]

> [The article reports a debate among House members about the necessity of closing a number of shipyards. At the same session the House passed a defense bill, 365 to 0, providing for $46 billion "requested by the Administration for major defense activities."]

6. Following is a statement by Harold Laski, an eminent British economist:[33]

> [Laski states that presently a civilian worker might be, unawares, in the employ of the armed services.]

7. From a book published in 1964 entitled The Passion of the Hawks:[34]

> [The selection comments sarcastically on the civilians who, envisioning their profits, encourage war. The writer includes among these "scalawages" the "military-industrial complex" unions, politicians, contractors and others, and he gives examples of how they operate.]

8. A cartoon reproduced in U. S. News and World Report, May 13, 1963:[35]

> [The cartoon shows an auction at which defense and space contracts are for sale. The highest bidder is a rotund individual who bears the label "politics."]

9. From a 1933 magazine article by Fiorello LaGuardia then serving in the House of Representatives:[36]

> [LaGuardia states that the biggest lobbies are those of the army and the navy. Some of their demands are justified but they do not hesitate to use any means available to further their causes.]

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[32] *Ibid.*, April 23, 1964, 1, 15.

[33] As quoted in Jack Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon* (Harper & Row, New York, Evanston, and London, 1964), 154.

[34] Tristram Coffin, *The Passion of the Hawks* (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1964), 157-158, 164-166.

[35] *U.S. News and World Report*, LIV (May 13, 1963), 40, (Quotation from copyrighted article in "U.S. News & World Report" of May 13, 1963.)

[36] As quoted in Maruitz A. Hallgren, *The Tragic Fallacy: A Study of America's War Policies* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1937), 233-234.

10. In 1920 Congressman Champ Clark made the following statement:[37]

> I have no objection to the General Staff either, except that I think they ought to attend to their business and let Congress attend to its business. (Applause) They get up every one of these army bills substantially. It is the second strongest lobby that has been around here since I have been in Congress. I think the Anti-Saloon League leads and the Regular Army officers come second.

11. In his book Power at the Pentagon, Jack Raymon reports an unidentified military legislative officer as saying:[38]

> [The officer claims that the most "obstreperous" Congressional critic of the military can be induced to change his position if he can be taken on a "junket" to see an operation for himself.]

12. The same work cites an observer as commenting:[39]

> [The claim is made that the public relations establishment of the military is unequalled in both public and private sectors and various media used by this group are listed.]

13. Hanson Baldwin, a noted author on military affairs, noted military editor of The New York Times wrote the following in 1949.[40]

> [Baldwin claims that the traditional methods of civilian control over the military are inadequate to deal with the complexities of the present situation. He advocates a Congressional agency to oversee the public information agencies of the government.]

E. The Secretary and the Colossus

The Department of Defense was created in 1947 in an effort to effect a measure of unification and centralized control of the three armed services. As the military establishment increased in the intervening years, the functions of the Department have become vastly more complicated. Under the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense exercises civilian control of the military forces of the United States. The responsibilities of that office prompted James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense to comment, "I do not believe that the head of this Government colossus . . . will ever have more than the superficial knowledge of the Department."[41] Forrestal's efforts to cope with the burdens of the office wore him down and finally affected his mind. The official Pentagon statement said that Forrestal's condition was "directly the result of excessive work during the war and postwar years."[42] On May 22, 1949, Forrestal committed suicide.

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[37] Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., XCIII, 9435.

[38] As quoted in Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, 189.

[39] As quoted in Ibid., 203.

[40] Lester Markel, Hanson W. Baldin, et. al., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1949), 116.

1. Before selecting Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense, President-elect John F. Kennedy appointed a number of "task forces" to study various substantive and organizational problems facing the new administration. A report on the Department of Defense called for a sweeping reorganization:[43]

> [The selection deals with the organization of the Defense Department. The writer states that all previous attempts to make more efficient the workings of this department have called for the preeminence of the Secretary of Defense. This end had not yet been satisfactorily accomplished and the writer concludes that the power of the Secretary must be expanded if the doctrine of civil control is to be honored.]

2. The following colloquy took place in April, 1964 while the House of Representatives was discussing the annual appropriations bill for the Defense Department:[44]

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[41] Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, 278.

[42] Ibid., 279.

[43] Ibid., 280-281.

[44] Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., CX, 8769-8773.

Mr. GUBSER [of California]. Mr. Chairman, I support this bill because taken on balance it is overwhelmingly good, with very little in it which is bad. But as we pass it, let us not fail to mention that it contains some far-reaching policy decisions which chould signal serious danger to our national security near the end of this decade. One of these decisions was to build a conventionally powered aircraft carrier instead of one which is nuclear powered. Another is to allow what I believe will be a serious degradation of our manned bomber force because of insufficient emphasis on a new manned strategic system. The result will be to paint ourselves into a strategic missile corner and to deny our Air Force the mixture of weapons which it should have to respond to a potential attack by an enemy who has the choice of the kind of war he will fight.

What concerns me, Mr. Chairman, is that the Secretary of Defense, through manipulation of classified information, through his release of data favorable to his point of view and his suppression of that which is unfavorable, is actually brainwashing the American people. Until February of this year I had only great admiration for Secretary McNamara, but several events since then have shaken my confidence.

During the missile versus bomber reliability controversy earlier this year, Secretary McNamara released part of a chart which, by comparison, made missiles look better than bombers. It was not until General LeMay testified before our committee a few days later that we learned that the Secretary had neglected to mention two complete categories of that same chart. These categories showed that bombers could deliver more megatonnage on target and more warheads on target. This placed an entirely different light on the controversy.

The recent Pentagon directive to favorably publicize the TFX[45] is another example of the effort to show that Secretary McNamara is 100 percent right 110 percent of the time, and that there is no side to the argument but his own. Yet this TFX is such a shaky concept at this very moment due to weight problems that they have not even executed a contract. General Dynamics at this moment is spending millions of dollars solely on the authority of a letter of intent.

In his recent response to General LeMay's testimony before the Appropriations Committee and in his release of previously secret figures about our strength as compared with Russia, the Secretary's facts were so incomplete as to actually constitute misrepresentation. . . .

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[45] The decision of Secretary McNamara to award a multimillion dollar contract to build TFX fighter planes to the General Dynamics Corporation of Texas was disputed by military leaders who had recommended a rival design submitted by the Boeing Corporation.

I contend that this is major brainwashing.

Now such manipulation of information that is released makes me wonder if in the operation of the Secretary's cost effectiveness technique -- if he does not regulate the input in his computer so as to get the answer which he desires.

Admiral Rickover and General LeMay have both stated that the cost effectiveness techniques is only reliable when you can predict the exact type of war that an enemy may impose upon you. We all know that since we have assumed a second strike posture that such a prediction is impossible and an enemy, as the aggressor, will have the choice of weapons.

If the truth were known, there are many otherpoints in this bomber versus missile controversy that the Secretary of Defense has not seen fit to give to the American people. For example, it is well known that only the bomber can successfully attack certain hardened sites. . . .

I say our negotiators at some future conference table can have theirhands strengthened by the existence of alerted bombers which are airborne. They will have an alternative to waiting for the point of no return when the button is pushed and the missile cannot be called back.

Mr. Chairman, I think these facts ought to be made known to the American people.

It was a self-assured mantle of invincibility and an overwhelming ego which led Napoleon Bonaparte to Waterloo. I fear and I sincerely feel that the aura of infallibility which Secretary McNamara has assumed for himself may well lead this Nation to an equally disastrous fate. . . .

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Mr. VINSON [Democrat of Georgia]. Mr. Chairman, during the debate yesterday the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Laird] mentioned the fact that under the 3 years of Mr. McNamara's term in office not one single new major weapons system had been developed and placed into inventory. I wish to suggest that one of the principal reasons why no new weapons systems have been developed and placed into inventory is because of the large number of cancellations of various weapons systems which Mr. McNamara has accomplished.

I wish to make a comparison in dollar amounts of weapons cancellation under Mr. McNamara in his 3 years of office and those under the Secretaries of Defense under Mr. Eisenhower.

I also wish to point out that undoubtedly many of the cancellations of weapons systems have been necessary because of obsolescence or because of the development of a competing weapons system developed parallel with the one which was canceled. But the cancellations of some system by Mr. McNamara are highly questionable.

Since Mr. McNamara has come into office he has canceled approximately $4,548 million worth of weapons which were in development but before they became operational. This was in a period of 3 years.

In a period of 8 years under the Eisenhower administration approximately $3,145 million worth of weapons systems were canceled before they became operational. . . .

I also point out that during the 3-year period under President Eisenhower, when the most weapons systems were canceled -- 1958, 1959, and 1960 -- only $1,758 million worth of weapons systems were canceled. That compares with the $4,548 million worth of weapons systems canceled under Mr. McNamara in the same period of time. . . .

Mr. WRIGHT [Democrat of Texas]. Through all of this I think I can detect a rather conscious attempt to denigrate and disparage the work of Secretary Robert S. McNamara. I am convinced, in spite of the occasions on which I find myself in slight disagreement with his decisions, that Secretary McNamara is one of the strongest, one of the most forceful, one of the most efficient and one of the best Secretaries of Defense this Nation has ever had. Secretary McNamara has not waited to make decisions. Secretary McNamara has not been afraid to take the bull by the horns and make the hard choices and then face up to the responsibility of those choices and to assume that responsibility on his own shoulders. He has not vacillated. He has not hesitated. He has not passed the buck.

As to the remark concerning the TFX or F-111, I am convinced and I believe I have every reason to be convinced that there is no problem and no trouble with the development of the TFX. I almost think this fact disappoints a few of the Members. It is moving ahead and on schedule and is going to fly on schedule. There is no major weight problem. If there is any weight problem it is brought about by the Navy version and the Navy's insistence on the addition of several new weighty devices not incorporated in the original design, and yet insisting that the original weight limit be kept to the pound. It will be kept, because those people who are designing and building that plane have been down the road. I want to say this in behalf of Secretary McNamara. This man has made many hard dedsions. On one recent occasion he ordered the phasing out of 36 bases, one of them in my district. I did not like that, but I have to honor him for having the courage of his conviction. I honor him for being interested in saving the taxpayers' money. It strikes me as rather strange that those who are criticizing him for his curtailment of expense are for the most part some of the same people who are always insisting that we save money in the Government. . . .

Here is the first man who has proven he is the Secretary of Defense. I think rather than bombers versus missiles, there is even a more fundamental issue at stake here. That issue is: Who is going to run the Defense Department, the civilians or the military?

The preeminence of civilian over military authority is a great American tradition. Those who attack Secretary McNamara seem to proceed from the impression that the Secretary of Defense and his service Secretaries are supposed to perform only a meaningless ceremonial function and leave all the decisions to the men in uniform.

If this were our policy, there would be no need for a man of the capabilities of Mr. McNamara in that crucial position. If he were not to perform the ultimate decisionmaking function, then indeed we would need no Secretary of Defense. Unless the civilian heads of our Defense Department are to have the authority that goes with their enormous responsibility, they will be of no value whatever to the Nation.

I concede that the average colonel in the Air Force probably knows more about the physical job of flying an airplane than does Secretary McNamara. But even his critics will have to agree that Secretary McNamara know infinitely more about the tools, techniques, technicalities, and requirements of manufacturing and production than any career military person in the country. With so great a share of the total budget devoted to military procurement, surely his knowledge, skill, and experience is one of our country's greatest assets.

But above and beyond the question of personalities is the broader, more fundamental question of just who is going to run this country -- the military or the civilian. Countries dominated by an all-powerful military clique had sent many of our forefathers to this land. They were determined that there should be no repetition of that situation here. And this basically is the issue at stake in the concerted effort to smear Secretary McNamara. The public is beginning to understand the issue at stake -- and in this the public backs Mr. McNamara. . . .

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add that if the logic of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright] were followed to its obvious conclusion, and the advice of men who have devoted their lifetime to becoming expert in the field of military science is to be ignored by civilian authorities we might as well save some real money. Abolish West Point, abolish Annapolis, abolish the Air Force Academy; let us turn the training of our generals over to the Ford Motor Co. and let themfight the war with Edsels. . . .

Mr. LAIRD [Republican of Wisconsin].1 Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright]. . . .

I can well understand why the gentleman from Texas is loud in his praise of the TFX R & D contract. And, perhaps, if I were a resident of, and a Representative from, the State of Texas I would have the same type of praise for TFX award of the Secretary of Defense and might voice the same kind of strong support for the TFX that he has. I am sure I would if I represented the Forth Worth area.

3. From the front page of The New York Times, September 5, 1963:[46]

[The headlines and article deal with Admiral Anderson's remarks on the growing conflict between civilian and military factions in the Defense Department. Anderson, a known critic of the Secretary of Defense, claimed that the civilian officials at the Pentagon often tried to "downgrade" the advice of the military group, and the civilians held the preponderance of power presently. Anderson's term as naval chief had not been renewed the previous spring, and he described this speech as an "epilogue" to his career. Anderson remarked upon specific issues, such as the TFX contract, and warned that civilians were making decisions in areas beyond their competance.]

4. From The New York Times, February 5, 1964:[47]

[General Curtis E. LeMay, it is reported, stressed before the House Armed Services Committee his belief in the future need for manned bombers. He criticized recent economies in the department and argued that missiles alone are not adequate. Robert McNamara stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee that manned bombers will soon be obsolete due to improvements in anti-aircraft defense systems.

5. From an article entitled "Whiz Kids vs. Military Men: Who is Shaping

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[46] The New York Times, September 5, 1963, 1, 19.

[47] Ibid., February 5, 1964, 12.

Defense?" which appeared in U. S. News and World Report, March 4, 1963:[48]

> [The writer describes conflicts in Washington over the question of who will formulate defense strategy, "whiz kids," that is, civilian scientists, or experienced military advisors. Details of each side are reviewed and particular stress is placed on the complaint of the military that the young men, whose number grows, do not understand the human element in military action and tend to simplify situations in order to be able to utilize computers in formulating strategy.]

6. From an article entitled "Why McNamara is Under Fire" which appeared in U. S. News and World Report, March 25, 1963:[49]

> [The selection recounts the conflict between the Administration and Congress over Defense expenditures. Secretary McNamara is in the middle of the fray. A major issue is the relationship of the civilian to military advisors in determining the budget.]

7. From A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy, written by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a noted historian who served in the White House as a Presidential Assistant to President Kennedy:[50]

> [The selection discusses the application of "operations research," or the "systematic quantitative analysis", to problems of defense. The technique forces planners to become more flexible in their thinking and to consider various alternatives to any decision. The Rand Corporation, established by the Air Force, is described as the most technically advanced of the institutions using the new methods. The writer explains that McNamara, who brought these techniques to the Pentagon, entered the Defense Department at a crucial point in its history, when the military had "grown into a small empire" but lacked coherent direction.
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> Although McNamara's team enthusiastically supported the use of new management techniques, they understood, to quote

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[48] "'Whiz Kids' vx. Military Men: Who is Shaping Defense?" U. S. News and World Report, LIV (March 4, 1963), 46-47. (Quotation from copyrighted article in "U.S. News & World Report" of March 4, 1963.)

[49] Ibid., (March 25, 1963), 22. (Quotation from Copyrighted article in"U. S. News & World Report" of March 25, 1963.)

[50] Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in the White House (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1965), 312-314.

Charles J. Hitch, that some subjects which "bear on the very fundamentals of national defense [are] simply not subject to any sort of rigorous, quantitative analysis."]

8. From U. S. News and World Report, December 16, 1963:[51]

[The problem of finding a successor to McNamara is raised. The power and information now "concentrated in the person of Mr. McNamara" would, it is claimed, demand an exceptionally strong individual.]

9. Following is a statement from Power at the Pentagon by Jack Raymond:[52]

[The writer claims that there is little difference between the "garrison state" set up by the military and that formed by civilians out of "concern for security."]

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[51] U. S. News and World Report, LV (December 16, 1963), 65. (Quotation from copyrighted article in "U. S. News & World Report" of December 16, 1963.)

[52] Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, 332.

SECTION V

SEVEN DAYS IN MAY

Following is a chapter from Seven Days in May, a popular novel which was later adapted for the screen:[1]

> [The selection presents a conversation between a high-ranking military official and the President. The officer outlines his suspicions of a military plot, planned by fellow officers, to take over the government.]

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[1] Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, Seven Days in May (Harper and Row, New York, 1962), 60-71.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READINGS

The following books are suggested as additional sources for the early American period. Daniel J. Boorstin, _The Americans, The Colonial Experiences_ (Random House, New York, 1958) deals with the role of the militia in colonial society in section entitled "A Nation of Minute Men" Howard H. Peckham, _The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762_ (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964) deals with the impact of the colonial wars on the military structure; Peckham's detailed description of the wars discusses the dangers faced by the colonists. E. S. Corwin, _The Constitution and What It Means Today_ (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1958). Edmund S. Morgan is concerned with the ideas guiding the founding fathers in the drafting of the Constitution.

For the modern period. Tristram Coffin, _The Passion of the Hawks_ (Macmillan Co., New York, 1964) is a well written book discussing the threat posed by the military-industrial complex today. John W. Spanier, _The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War_* (W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1965) is an analysis of the controversy, with particular emphasis in Chapter XIV on its implications for the relationship between civil and military authority. Jack Raymond, _Power at the Pentagon_ (Harper & Row, New York, 1964) probes the great influence exerted on the federal government by the military. _The Crucial Decade, America, 1945-1955_* (Knopf, New York, 1956) by E. Goldman is a lively account of the beginning of the cold war and its implications for our military establishment.